Can international environmental cooperation be bought?

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 202, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 255-264

  Fuentes Albero, Cristina ^a   Rubio, Santiago J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

C72; D62; Emissions; F02; Linear environmental damages; Q20; Self enforcing international environmental agreements; Transfers

Indexed keywords

C72; D62; EMISSIONS; F02; LINEAR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES; Q20; SELF-ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; TRANSFERS;

GAME THEORY;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;

EID: 70349748466     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.006     Document Type: Article

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