The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 357-377

  Dellink, Rob ^a,b   Finus, Michael ^c   Olieman, Niels ^a,d  

^a WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HAGEN   (Germany)

^d RABOBANK   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Climate change modelling; International environmental agreements; Non cooperative game theory; Uncertainty

Indexed keywords

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL METHODS; ROBUSTNESS (CONTROL SYSTEMS); UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING; CLIMATE COALITIONS;

CLIMATE CHANGE;

CLIMATE; CLIMATE CHANGE; CLIMATE MODELING; COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT;

EID: 41049108657     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9130-7     Document Type: Article

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