The effect of liquidity on governance

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 1443-1482

  Edmans, Alex ^a   Fang, Vivian W ^b   Zur, Emanuel ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877898800     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht012     Document Type: Article

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