Informal governance in international organizations: Introduction to the special issue

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 121-136

  Stone, Randall W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876987632     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9168-y     Document Type: Editorial

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