Patience or fairness? analyzing social preferences in repeated games

Games

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 56-77

  Duffy, John ^a   Muñoz García, Félix ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Inequity aversion; Prisoner's dilemma; Repeated games; Social preferences; Time discounting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876933940     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20734336     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3390/g3010056     Document Type: Article

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