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Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 431-443

The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games

Author keywords

Convexity; Monotonicity; Public randomization; Repeated game

Indexed keywords


EID: 77952422254     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0219-9     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (12)

References (14)
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  • 2
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  • 3
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    • Ellison, G.1
  • 4
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    • The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 5
    • 0000919418 scopus 로고
    • On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
    • Fudenberg D, Maskin E (1991) On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games. J Econ Theory 53: 428-438.
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Maskin, E.2
  • 6
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    • The folk theorem with imperfect public information
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    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Maskin, E.3
  • 7
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    • Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
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    • (2007) Games Econ Behav , vol.61 , pp. 27-49
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Takahashi, S.3
  • 8
    • 84963062934 scopus 로고
    • The use of information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
    • Kandori M (1992) The use of information in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Rev Econ Stud 59: 581-593.
    • (1992) Rev Econ Stud , vol.59 , pp. 581-593
    • Kandori, M.1
  • 10
    • 0036331306 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma
    • Mailath G, Obara I, Sekiguchi T (2002) The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. Games Econ Behav 40: 99-122.
    • (2002) Games Econ Behav , vol.40 , pp. 99-122
    • Mailath, G.1    Obara, I.2    Sekiguchi, T.3
  • 11
    • 0032222404 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
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    • Olszewski, W.1
  • 12
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    • Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
    • Salonen H, Vartiainen H (2008) Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors. Econ Lett 99: 595-598.
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    • Salonen, H.1    Vartiainen, H.2
  • 13
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    • On repeated games with complete information
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    • Sorin, S.1
  • 14
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    • The 'folk theorem' for repeated games with complete information
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    • Wen, Q.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.