Inequity aversion may increase inequity

Economic Journal

Volumn 117, Issue 519, 2007, Pages

  Montero, Maria ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; EQUITY; MODEL;

EID: 34250321384     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02041.x     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

1. Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J.M., Strauss, A.B. and Ting, M. M. (2005). 'Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments', American Journal of Political Science, vol. 49(3) (July), pp. 550-63.
2. Banks, J.S. and Duggan, J. (2000). 'A bargaining model of collective choice', American Political Science Review, vol. 94(1) (March), pp. 73-88.
3. Baron, D. (1991). 'A spatial bargaining theory of government formation in parliamentary systems', American Political Science Review, vol. 85(1) (March), pp. 137-64.
4. Baron, D.P. and Ferejohn, J.A. (1989). 'Bargaining in legislatures', American Political Science Review, vol. 83(4) (December), pp. 1181-206.
5. Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (1998). 'Strategy and equity: An ERC-analysis of the Güth-van Damme game', Journal of Mathematical Psychology, vol. 42 (June), pp. 215-26.
6. Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). 'ERC - a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition', American Economic Review, vol. 90(1) (March), pp. 166-93.
7. Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8. Falk, A., Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2003). 'On the nature of fair behavior', Economic Inquiry, vol. 41 (January), pp. 20-6.
9. Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). 'A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation', Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114 (August), pp. 817-68.
10. Fischbacher, U., Fong, C. M. and Fehr, E. (2003). 'Fairness, errors and the power of competition', IEW Working Paper No 133.
11. Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H. and Lehrer, S. F. (2003). 'Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules', American Political Science Review, vol. 97(2) (May), pp. 221-32.
12. Fréchette, G. R., Kagel, J. H. and Morelli, M. (2005). 'Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol and discounting in legislative bargaining', Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89 (August), pp. 1497-517.
13. Harrington, J.E. (1990). 'The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 3 (June), pp. 135-54.
14. Kagel, J.H. and Wolfe, K.W. (2001). 'Tests of fairness models based on equity considerations in a three-person ultimatum game', Experimental Economics, vol. 4 (December), pp. 203-19.
15. Kalandrakis, A. (2004). 'A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 116 (April), pp. 294-322.
16. McKelvey, R.D. and Riezman, R. (1992). 'Seniority in legislatures', American Political Science Review, vol. 86(4) (December), pp. 951-65.
17. Montero, M. (2006). 'Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 54(2) (February), pp. 380-97.
18. Neilson, W. S. (2006). 'Axiomatic reference-dependence in behavior towards others and towards risk', Economic Theory, vol. 28(3) (August), pp. 681-92.
19. Okada, A. (1996). 'A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 16(1) (September), pp. 97-108.
20. Okada, A. and Riedl, A. (2005). 'Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: Experimental evidence', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 50(2) (February), pp. 278-311.
21. Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M. and Zamir, S. (1991). 'Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An experimental study', American Economic Review, vol. 81(5) (December), pp. 1068-95.