Dynamic pay-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising

Operations Research

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 98-111

  Nazerzadeh, Hamid ^a   Saberi, Amin ^b   Vohra, Rakesh ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

^c NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Click fraud; Cost per action; Dynamic mechanism design; Online advertising; Pay per action; Prior free mechanisms; Sponsored search

Indexed keywords

CLICK FRAUD; COST-PER-ACTION; DYNAMIC MECHANISM; ONLINE ADVERTISING; PAY-PER-ACTION; SPONSORED SEARCHES;

LEARNING ALGORITHMS; MACHINE DESIGN;

MARKETING;

EID: 84876107152     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1120.1124     Document Type: Article

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