The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 99-106

  Devanur, Nikhil R ^a   Kakade, Sham M ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b TOYOTA TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Multi armed bandit; Online; Pay per click; Regret; Truthful

Indexed keywords

CLICK-THROUGH RATE; EXPECTED REVENUE; MULTI ARMED BANDIT; STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS; VICKREY AUCTION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; PROFITABILITY;

ELECTRIC CONDUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT;

EID: 77950579624     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1566374.1566388     Document Type: Conference Paper

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