Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 43-52

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Kleinberg, Robert D ^b   Slivkins, Aleksandrs ^a  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

multi armed bandits; single parameter mechanism design; truthful auctions

Indexed keywords

A-MONOTONE; ALLOCATION FUNCTION; ALLOCATION RULE; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; DIJKSTRA'S ALGORITHMS; LOWER BOUNDS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI ARMED BANDIT; MULTI-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM; OFFLINE; PARAMETER MECHANISMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; RUNNING TIME; SHORTEST PATH; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; GRAPH THEORY; INFORMATION THEORY; WAVELET TRANSFORMS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 77954724843     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1807342.1807349     Document Type: Conference Paper

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