Dynamic cost-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising

Proceeding of the 17th International Conference on World Wide Web 2008, WWW'08

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 179-188

  Nazerzadeh, Hamid ^a   Saberi, Amin ^a   Vohra, Rakesh ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cost per action; Internet advertising; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ACTION MECHANISMS; BAYESIAN; DESIGNING EFFICIENT; DISTRIBUTED RANDOM VARIABLES; DYNAMIC COSTS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; INTERNET ADVERTISING; MECHANISM DESIGN; ON-LINE ADVERTISINGS; REFLECTED BROWNIAN MOTIONS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS; BROWNIAN MOVEMENT; CLUSTER ANALYSIS; COSTS; INTERNET; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; LEARNING SYSTEMS; RANDOM VARIABLES; WORLD WIDE WEB;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 57349089149     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1367497.1367522     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

1. G. Aggarwal, A. Goel, and R. Motwani. Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords. Proceedings of ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006.
2. S. Athey, and I. Segal. An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism. manuscript, 2007.
3. P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, and P. Fischer. Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem. Machine Learning archive, Volume 47 , Issue 2-3, 235-256, 2002.
4. A. Bapna, and T. Weber. Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Uncertain Valuations. Working Paper, 2006.
5. M. Balcan, A. Blum, J. Hartline, and Y. Mansour. Mechanism Design via Machine Learning. Proceedings of 46th Annual IEEE Symposium, on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005.
6. D. Bergemann, and J. Välimäki. Efficient Dynamic Auctions. Proceedings of Third Workshop on-Sponsored Search Auctions, 2007.
7. A. Borodin, and P. Salminen. Handbook of Brownian Motion: Facts and Formulae. Springer, 2002.
8. A. Blum, V. Kumar, A. Rudra, and F. Wu. Online Learning in Online Auctions. Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2003.
9. R. Cavallo, D. Parkes, and S. Singh, Efficient Online Mechanism for Persistent, Periodically Inaccessible Self-interested Agents. Working Paper, 2007.
10. K. Crawford. Google CFO: Fraud A Big Threat. CNN/Money, December 2, 2004.
11. J. Gittins. Multi-Armed Bandit Allocation Indices. Wiley, New York, NY, 1989.
12. R. Gonen, and E. Pavlov. An Incentive-Compatible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 2007.
13. B. Grow, B. Elgin, and M. Herbst. Click Fraud: The dark side of online advertising. Business Week. Cover Story, October 2, 2006.
14. N. Immorlica, K. Jain, M. Mahdian, and K. Talwar. Click Fraud Resistant Methods for Learning Click-Through Rates. Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 2005.
15. B. Kitts, P. Laxminarayan, B. LeBlanc, and R. Meech. A Formal Analysis of Search Auctions Including Predictions on Click Fraud and Bidding Tactics. Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, 2005.
16. R. Kleinberg. Online Decision Problems With Large Strategy Sets. Ph.D. Thesis, MIT, 2005.
17. S. Lahaie, and D. Parkes. Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation. Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, 2004.
18. M. Mahdian, and K. Tomak. Pay-per-action model for online advertising. Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 549-557, 2007.
19. P. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
20. D. Mitchell. Click Fraud and Halli-bloggers. New York Times, July 16, 2005.
21. N. Nisan, T, Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani, editors. Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
22. D. Parkes. Online Mechanisms Algorithmic Game Theory (Nisan et al. eds.), 2007.
23. B. Stone. When Mice Attack: Internet Scammers Steal Money with "Click Fraud". Newsweek, January 24, 2005.
24. R. Wilson. Game-Theoretic Approaches to Trading Processes. Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, ed. by T. Bewley, chap. 2, pp. 33-77, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
25. J. Wortman, Y. Vorobeychik, L. Li, and J. Langford. Maintaining Equilibria During Exploration in Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 2007.