Multi-tiered political questions: The ECJ'S mandate in enforcing subsidiarity

Legisprudence

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 321-346

  Vandenbruwaene, Werner ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Better regulation; ECJ; EU competences; Impact assessment; Judicial review; Mandate of article 19(1); Pluralism; Political question doctrine; Subsidiarity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875886497     PISSN: 17521467     EISSN: 17521475     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5235/17521467.6.3.321     Document Type: Article

References (260)

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6. This cooperation extends over multiple processes: in negotiating and adopting the law, in implementing, and even cooperation in reviewing the law.
7. P. Dann, 'The Political Institutions' in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 243.
8. This theoretical postulate between autonomy - democratic self-expression, and cooperation - efficiency concerns is rendered here as a conceptual picture, but not a perfect 1:1 fit. See e.g. the problem of structural bias in national democratic processes.
9. M. Kumm, 'Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets' (2006) 12 European Law Journal 513.
10. A. Vermeule, The System of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2011) 51-54.
11. For a systemic analysis, where subsidiarity offsets failures of local representative democracy with arguments of efficiency. Indeed, from a top-down perspective, the inclusion of lower levels in decision-making is an optimal strategy to reduce the number of the outvoted.
12. K. Holzinger, A. Schneider and K. Zimmermann, 'Minimizing the Losers: Regime Satisfaction in Multilevel Systems' (2011) 22 Constitutional Political Economy 303.
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14. On these factors of legitimacy.
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19. In particular Part II.
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24. Discussing the network paradigm as a decentralized model of jurisdictional conflict resolution.
25. I treat judicial and constitutional review interchangeably, since the focus is on how judges review legislation, rather than which judges may do so. For conceptual distinction and application to EU and US.
26. A. Heringa and Ph. Kiiver, Constitutions Compared (Intersentia 2012) 160-184.
27. The need for judicial engagement, and coordination, derives from the complex and non-hierarchical character of the legal space.
28. P. Bußjäger, 'Linearität oder Komplexität? Zur Problematik der Theorie von Mehrebenensystemen am Beispiel der Europäischen Union' (2005) Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 252.
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31. Tterming this 'mutual embedded openness' of legal systems (e.g. EU and MS) to assure a complementarity between projects of governance.
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33. L. Henkin, 'Is there a 'Political Question' Doctrine?' (1975) Yale Law Journal 597.
34. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (The Foundation Press 1978) 71 fn. 1.
35. W. Vandenbruwaene, 'The Judicial Enforcement of Subsidiarity: The Quest for an Appropriate Standard' in P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan and W. Vandenbruwaene (eds.), The Role of Constitutional Courts in a Context of Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 131-164.
36. N. Achterberg, Theorie und Dogmatik des Öffentlichen Rechts (Duncker & Humblot 1981) 229.
37. R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford University Press 2009) 263.
38. V. Skouris, 'Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Seine Bedeutung in der Rechtsprechung des des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften' in Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber Amicorum L. Wildhaber (Nomos 2007) 1558.
39. A. Biondi, 'Subsidiarity in the Courtroom' in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.), EU law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) 220.
40. G. de Búrca, 'Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law' in Bernitz and Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of EC Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 108.
41. A principle of law is active at both the positive and ideal dimension of law.
42. J. Bengoetxea, 'Principia and Teloi' in S. Besson and P. Pichonnaz (eds.), Les Principes en Droit Européen (Schultess 2011) 65-84.
43. In the positive sense, subsidiarity aims at constraining and legitimizing power exercise in a multi-layered environment. In an ideal sense, subsidiarity translates the structural aim at a rational and coordinate relationship between levels.
44. A. Gamper, 'Subsidiarität und Kompetenztheorie' in A. Gamper and P. Bußjäger (eds.), Subsidiarität Anwenden: Regionen, Staaten, Europäischen Union (Institut für Föderalismus 2006) 121-125.
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46. D. Halberstam, 'Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary' in K.E. Whittington, R.D. Keleman and G.A. Caldeira (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Pres 2008) 152-154.
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48. F. Mayer, 'Competences-reloaded? The Vertical Division of Powers in the EU and the New European Constitution' (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 498.
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51. A. Guzman, How International Law Works (Oxford Univeristy Press 2008) 170.
52. More in general on the incentives for inter- and supranational cooperation.
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54. Next to positive and negative norms, this third category regulates the exercise of competences.
55. N. Colneric, 'Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Kompetenzgericht' (2002) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 709.
56. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1961) 68-69.
57. T. Schilling, 'Subsidiarity as a Rule and as a Principle' (1994) 14 Yearbook of European Law 203-255.
58. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 25.
59. G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 2012) 139.
60. The functioning of legal principles in the jurisprudence of the ECJ demonstrates this effect: serving as an interpretative guide, as grounds for review (both EU and national measures) and as basis for a damages action.
61. P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2012) 251-252.
62. K. Lenaerts and J. Guttierrez-Fons, 'The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of Law' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1629.
63. A. von Bogdandy, 'Founding Principles' in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 14-18.
64. This distinction, though commonplace, is useful to reiterate when discussing normative objections to preclude judicial subsidiarity review. Arguments have to be categorized by their addressee, namely, subsidiarity-the-principle or subsidiarity-the-rule.
65. A.G. Toth, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty' (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 1079.
66. Argues against the adoption of subsidiarity because the principle is 'contrary to the logic, structure and wording of the founding Treaties', and because it is difficult to apply. He switches between two formal instances of subsidiarity: the dimensions of principle and rule. Frankly stated, the inclusion of the principle and compatibility with the Treaty is a concern of the pouvoir constituant. And certainly not of the judiciary - the seminal words of Thomas Cooley echo: 'The judiciary, though the final judge of what the law is, is not the judge of what the law should be.'.
67. Th. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America (Little Brown 1898) 158.
68. J. Palacio Gonzalez, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity: A Guide for Lawyers with a Particular Community Orientation' (1994) 20 European Law Review 365-366.
69. For an overview and nuanced distinction of the arguments.
70. The initial approaches to subsidiarity by the various EU institutions demonstrate the need for conceptual clarity. See the rendering by.
71. G. de Búrca, 'The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union' (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 366-368.
72. On this concept, see: Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-5040; Case C-114/01 AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy [2003] ECR I-8752.
73. T. Tridimas, 'The Rule of Reason and Its Relation to Proportionality and Subsidiarity' in A. Schrauwen (ed.), Rule of Reason: Rethinking Another Classic of European Legal Doctrine (Europa Law Publishing 2005) 118.
74. T. Horsley, 'Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the Subsidiarity Jigsaw?' (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 267.
75. On the capabilities of the European Commission as agenda-setter and political mediator.
76. P. Dann, 'The Political Institutions' in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 259-260.
77. The institutional balance in the composition of the legislator and procedure of law-making grants each participating institution a degree of discretion, including the option to draw different conclusions from the impact assessment. Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-07027, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras. 85-86.
78. Ironically, the degree of judicial deference towards the legislator can also be captured under the umbrella of 'subsidiarity', conferatur the functioning of the principle of subsidiarity in the ECHR.
79. J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (M. Nijhoff, 2009) 227-236.
80. For example, the requirement of legal basis ex the principle of conferral, which must be based on objective indicators, see: Case C-45/86 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities [1987] ECR I-1520 at [11]; Case C-300/89 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities [1991] ECR I-2867 at [10]; Case C-155/07 European Parliament v. Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-8103 at [34].
81. K. Lenaerts, Constitutie en Rechter (Kluwer 1983) 222.
82. Joined cases C-402/05P; 415/05P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I- 6351, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 37: 'The duty of the Court of Justice is to act as the constitutional court of the municipal legal order that is the Community.'.
83. L. Bloom, Methods of Interpretation: How the Supreme Court Reads the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2009) 169-203.
84. Noting at page 184 the importance of structural arguments in determining the appropriate intensity of judicial review.
85. J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993) 36-42.
86. N. Fennelly, 'Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice' (1996) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 656, 662-664.
87. J. Mertens de Wilmars, 'Réflexions sur les Méthodes d'Interprétation de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes' (Cahiers de Droit Européen 7, 1986).
88. L. Corrias, The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice (Springer 2011) 150.
89. A. Stone Sweet, 'The European Court of Justice' in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2011) 128.
90. H. Rösler, 'Interpretation of EU Law' in J. Basedow, K.J. Hopt and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 980.
91. N. Fennelly, 'Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice' (1996) 20 Fordham International Law Journal 656, 662-664.
92. J.V. Louis et al., La Cour de Justice: Les Actes des Institutions (Commentaire Mégret 10, Université de Bruxelles 1993) 24-25.
93. In a material sense the analysis of Basedow, pointing out that recent decisions show an increased weight accorded to the preservation of national competences, especially in the area of private law, and through the preliminary references.
94. J. Basedow, 'The Judge's Role in European Integration: The Court of Justice and its Critics' in H.W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia 2012) 65-79.
95. With respect to national measures relating to the internal market.
96. N. Boeger, 'Minimum Harmonisation, Free Movement, and Proportionality' in P. Syrpis (ed.), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (Cambridge University Press 2012) 62-91.
97. K. Lenaerts, 'Federalism and the Rule of Law at the ECJ' (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1386.
98. K. St. Claire Bradley, 'Powers and Procedures in the EU Constitution' in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2011) 104-109.
99. E. Sharpston and G. de Baere, 'The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Adjudicator' in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart Publishing 2011) 124.
100. M. Kumm, 'Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets' (2006) 12 European Law Journal 513, 532.
101. J. Jowell, 'Administrative Justice and Standards of Substantive Judicial Review' in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford University Press 2008) 172-186.
102. I. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative Process' (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 1915.
103. R. Schütze, EU Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 264-268.
104. In the legislative phase, the formal and substantive dimension of subsidiarity cannot easily be separated. The very process of drafting an IA and considering the impact in terms of the subsidiarity calculus raises awareness of the substantive value of subsidiarity and hence may influence the decision-making process in a material sense. For a similar remark with regards to fundamental rights.
105. H. Toner, 'Impact Assessment and Fundamental Rights Protection in EU Law' (2006) 31 European Law Review 333.
106. The substantive criteria were developed in the Edinburgh Guidelines, and resulted in Article 5 of the Amsterdam protocol on subsidiarity, but disappeared in the Lisbon version. Currently, they function in the Impact Assessment Guidelines. This reallocation of the substantive criteria to the realm of soft law (IA guidelines) coincides with the emphasis on political and procedural enforcement of subsidiarity.
107. A. Meuwese, 'Embedding Consultation Procedures: Law or Institutionalization?' (2011) 17 European Public Law 527.
108. M. Dawson, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (Cambridge University Press 2011) 257.
109. D. Keyaerts, De Doorwerking van het Wetgevingsbeleid in de Rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie (University of Antwerp 2011) 207-225.
110. Arguing that the ECJ should review the minimum standards of consultation, self-imposed by the Commission.
111. Narrowly speaking, the judicial control of mandated consultation is part of a procedural review, located within the legislative process.
112. A. Cygan, 'Regional Governance, Subsidiarity and Accountability within the EU's Multi-Level Polity' (2013) European Public Law (forthcoming).
113. For an analysis of the constitutional status of regions within the EU). This standing for the Committee of the Regions may also increase the influence of its opinion in the ex ante consultations.
114. K. Lenaerts and N. Cambien, 'Regions and the European Court: Giving Shape to the Regional Dimension of the Member States' (2010) 35 European Law Review 625.
115. I. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Semiprocedural Review' (2012) 6(3) Legisprudence 271.
116. W. Vandenbruwaene, 'The Judicial Enforcement of Subsidiarity: The Quest for an Appropriate Standard' in P. Popelier, A. Mazmanyan and W. Vandenbruwaene (eds.), The Role of Constitutional Courts in a Context of Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 131-164.
117. For the case-law analysis.
118. A. Biondi, 'Subsidiarity in the Courtroom' in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.), EU law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) 213-227.
119. K. Lenaerts, 'The ECJ and Process-oriented Review' (2012) College of Europe Research Papers in Law No. 1/2012.
120. M. Rosenfeld, 'Comparing Constitutional Review by the European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court' (2006) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 618.
121. On comparing the US Supreme Court and the ECJ, in particular at page 644 on the methods of interpretation.
122. L. Henkin, 'Is there a 'Political Question' Doctrine?' (1975) Yale Law Journal 597.
123. P. Daly, 'Justiciability and the Political Question Doctrine' [2010] Public Law 161.
124. A. Knook, Europe's Constitutional Court (University of Utrecht 2009) 86.
125. M. Redish, 'Judicial Review and the "Political Question"' (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1031.
126. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (The Foundation Press 1978) 71 fn. 1.
127. F. Scharpf, 'Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis' (1966) 75 Yale Law Journal 517.
128. M. Redish, 'Judicial Review and the "Political Question"' (1985) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1031.
129. R. Fallon, 'Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning' (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 1274, 1276.
130. Henkin tentatively points out that the degree of deference as embodied by the political question doctrine, has to be extraordinary in the sense that the doctrine controls 'issues which prima facie and by usual criteria would seem to be for the courts, but will be left for political decision'.
131. L. Henkin, 'Is there a 'Political Question' Doctrine?' (1975) Yale Law Journal 597, 599.
132. Deference is the act of following a determination by another decision-maker that one might not have reached had one decided the question independently, definition by.
133. P. Horwitz, 'Three Faces of Deference' (2007) 83 Notre Dame Law Review 1072.
134. R. Barkow, 'More Supreme than the Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy' (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 237, 323-330.
135. Arguing that reasons of structure, constitutional text, and institutional capacity should guide the degree of judicial review.
136. N.K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (University of Chicago Press 1994) 254.
137. Suggesting that the variation in intensity of judicial review is determined by a comparative institutional choice.
138. P. Horwitz, 'Three Faces of Deference' (2007) 83 Notre Dame Law Review 1072.
139. C. Borgmann, 'Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding' (2009) 84 Indiana Law Journal 16-21.
140. Discerning between institutional legitimacy and superior competence as grounds for deference towards the legislature, which roughly translates to Horwitz' distinction.
141. N. Emiliou, 'Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier against "the Enterprises of Ambition"?' (1992) European Law Review 383.
142. Case C-404/06 Quelle AG v. Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände [2008] ECR I-2685 at [32].
143. H. Rösler, 'Interpretation of EU Law' in J. Basedow, K.J. Hopt and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 979.
144. J. Mertens de Wilmars, 'Réflexions sur les Méthodes d'Interprétation de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes' [1986] Cahiers de Droit Européen 14-15.
145. S. Schonberg and K. Frick, 'Finishing, Refining, Polishing: On the Use of Travaux Préparatoires as an Aid to the Interpretation of Community Legislation' (2003) 28 European Law Review 149.
146. Nuanced with respect to secondary legislation.
147. B. Schima, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Manzsche Verlag 1994) 16.
148. A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford University Press 2002) 74.
149. G. de Búrca, 'Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law' in U. Bernitz and J. Nergelius (eds.), General Principles of EC Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 103.
150. P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2012) 390-398.
151. R. Schütze, 'Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?' (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 527.
152. F. Chaltiel, 'Le Principe de Subsidiarité Dix Ans après le Traité de Maastricht' (2003).
153. Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union Européenne 369: '[I]l ne semble pas - encore? - possible de percevoir la subsidiarité, en tant que principe juridique contraignant, comme un moyen juridique décisif dans le cadre d'un contentieux communataire.'.
154. T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 183-188.
155. Who deploys a holistic conception of subsidiarity: a principle, political in nature, and a rule which gives much scope for subjective evaluation. Though correct at an abstract level, only one of these objections, by exclusion, can function in an analysis of judicial review of subsidiarity.
156. A. Fritzsche, 'Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in European Law' (2010) Common Market Law Review 380.
157. The case concerned the absence of initiation of anti-subsidy proceedings against Brazil.
158. Case C-191/82 EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation (FEDIOL) v. Commission of the European Communities [1983] ECR I-2913 at [30].
159. For a general application of the classical political question model, see: Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-07027 at [28]: 'In such a context, the Community judicature cannot substitute its assessment of scientific and technical facts for that of the legislature on which the Treaty has placed that task.' (emphasis added).
160. H. Schepel and E. Blankenburg, 'Mobilizing the European Court of Justice' in G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2001) 9-10.
161. G. Conway, 'Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ' (2010) 11 German Law Journal 988.
162. M. Kumm, 'Constitutionalizing Subsidiarity in Integrated Markets' (2006) 12 European Law Journal 513, 520.
163. L. Bauer, 'The European Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court' (2009) 3 International Constitutional Law Journal 268, 277-281.
164. Commission, 'Impact Assessment Guidelines' SEC (2009) 92, 23 (five questions to assess compliance with subsidiarity). See also the Committee of the Regions subsidiarity grid that provides a template around which consultation of the Committee's members is organized: 'Subsidiarity and Proportionality Assessment Grid', http://www.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity accessed 31 December 2012.
165. P. Herzog, 'Article 5 TEU' in Smit, Herzog et al. (eds.), Smit and Herzog on the Law of the European Union (Matthew Bender 2012) 11.
166. D. Edward, 'Subsidiarity as a Legal Concept' in P. Cardonnel, A. Rosas and N. Wahl (eds.), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System (Hart Publishing 2012) 102.
167. R. Schütze, EU Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 178.
168. Stating that 'the wording of art. 5(3) TEU is indeed a textual failure'.
169. W. Vandenbruwaene, 'The Legal Enforcement of Subsidiarity through the Lens of Flanders' in J. Loisen and F. de Ville (eds.), Subsidiarity and Multi-Level Governance (Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts 2012) 63-76.
170. U. Böttger, Ansätze für eine ökonomische Analyse des Subsidiaritätsprinzips des EG Art. 5 Abs. 2 (Duncker & Humblot 2004) 77-91.
171. C. Callies, Subsidiaritäts- und Solidaritätsprinzip in der Europäischen Union (Nomos 1999) 271-78.
172. K. Meßerschmidt, Gesetzgebungsermessen (Nomos 2000) 964-69.
173. M. Brenncke, 'Case-note C-58/08, Vodafone' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 1802.
174. S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson 2002) 180.
175. K. Lenaerts and P. van Yperseele, 'Le Principe de Subsidiarité et Son Contexte' [1994] Cahiers de Droit Européen 76.
176. M. Zuleeg, 'Justiziabilität des Subsidiaritätsprinzips' in K.W. Nörr and T. Oppermann (eds.), Subsidiarität: Idee und Wirklichkeit (J. Mohr 1997) 193.
177. E. Swaine, 'Subsidiarity and Self-interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 62.
178. T. Koopmans, 'Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary' (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 112.
179. Case C-491/01 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2002] ECR I-11453 at [123]; Case C-84/94 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of the European Union [1996] ECR I-5755 at [58]; Case C-233/94 Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [1997] ECR I-2405 at [55]-[56].
180. T. von Danwitz, 'Subsidiaritätskontrolle in der Europäischen Union' in K.P. Dolde et al. (eds.), Festschrift D. Sellner (Beck, 2010) 45.
181. It translates as: 'Judicial control of subsidiarity has to focus on what the ECJ in a meaningful way can review.'.
182. Likewise, G. de Búrca, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor' (1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 225.
183. R. Fallon, 'Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning' (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 1274, 1277.
184. Case C-241/87 Maclaine Watson & Company Limited v. Council and Commission of the European Communities [1990] ECR I-1797, Opinion AG Darmon, para. 100.
185. R. Fallon, 'Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning' (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 1274, 1331.
186. R. Barkow, 'More Supreme than the Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy' (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 237, 309-311.
187. On the relationship between the political question doctrine and the commerce power.
188. US v. Lopez, 514 US 549, 567-68 (1995).
189. K. Lenaerts, 'The ECJ and Process-oriented Review' (2012) College of Europe Research Papers in Law No. 1/2012.
190. S. Weatherill, 'The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Caselaw Has Become a "Drafting Guide"' (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 846.
191. Case C-98/78 A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69 at [5]; Case C-16/90 Detlef Nölle, trading as 'Eugen Nölle' v. Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen [1991] ECR I-5163 at [12]; Case C-326/05P Industrias Químicas del Vallés SA v. Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-6557 at [76].
192. Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5469 at [14]; Case C-120/97 Upjohn Ltd v. The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others [1999] ECR I-223 at [34].
193. Case C-58/08 Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-4999 at [72]: '[T]he principle of subsidiarity is referred to in the second paragraph of Article 5 EC - and given actual definition by the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty -, which provides that the Community, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, is to take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. That protocol, in paragraph 5, also lays down guidelines for the purposes of determining whether those conditions are met.'.
194. For the functional interpretation of Aticle 296 TFEU, see: Case C-203/85 Nicolet Instrument GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen [1986] ECR I-2058 at [7]-[11]; Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5501 at [26]; ECJ, Joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, on the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales [2005] ECR I-6451 at [133]-[134].
195. Commission, '18th Report on Better Lawmaking' COM (2011) 344 final, 2.
196. P. Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press 2012) 432-433.
197. Case C-58/08 Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR I-4999; Case C-176/09, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union [2011] OJ C204/11.
198. R. Revesz and M. Livermore, Retaking Rationality (Oxford University Press 2008) 157-159.
199. For an application of the Impact Assessment via procedural requirements and substantive review in the case of US administrative law. An exemplary case is Owner-Operator Independent Drivers v. FMCSA, n. 06-1035 (D.C. Cir. 24 July 2007) 494 F.3d 188 (failure to explain the methodology of its studies renders two administrative decisions arbitrary and capricious).
200. A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Kluwer 2008) 257.
201. A. Alemanno, 'The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward?' (2009) 15 European Law Journal 382.
202. P. Craig, 'Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis' (2012) 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 72, 78.
203. Actually, the IA was used by the ECJ to discuss proportionality.
204. D. Keyaerts, 'Ex ante Evaluation of EU Legislation Intertwined with Judicial Review? Comment on Vodafone Ltd v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (C-58/08)' (2010) 35(6) European Law Review 869, 880.
205. A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Kluwer 2008) 257.
206. T. von Danwitz, 'Subsidiaritätskontrolle in der Europäischen Union' in K.P. Dolde et al. (eds.), Festschrift D. Sellner (Beck 2010) 46.
207. G. Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States' (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 392.
208. On the general efficacy of a procedural review.
209. A. Alemanno, 'The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward?' (2009) 15 European Law Journal 382, 395.
210. J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993) 130.
211. For a theoretical basis.
212. For example, in Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport [2010] ECR I-07027 at [27]-[42], the ECJ investigated the manifest error of assessment, argued by the litigant, on the basis of the Commission's impact assessment. The Court notes the broad discretion granted to the legislator on functional grounds, i.e. the legislature is better equipped than the Court to assess 'highly complex scientific and technical facts'. Hence the reduction of judicial review to a marginal control, to bar manifest errors of assessment.
213. Afton Chemical submitted that the IA did not support the Commission's conclusions. The Court developed its view on IA: it noted its non-binding character toward other institutions, it observed moreover the 'scientific basis' that the Commission is to take into account, the obligation to take new evidence or date into account, and reiterated its view on the judicial review of legislative discretion.
214. Case C-310/04 Kingdom of Spain v. Council of the European Union [2007] ECR I-7318 at [122]- [123]: '[E]ven though such judicial review is of limited scope, it requires that the Community institutions which have adopted the act in question must be able to show before the Court that in adopting the act they actually exercised their discretion, which presupposes the taking into consideration of all the relevant factors and circumstances of the situation the act was intended to regulate. It follows that the institutions must at the very least be able to produce and set out clearly and unequivocally the basic facts which had to be taken into account as the basis of the contested measures of the act and on which the exercise of their discretion depended.'.
215. Case C-73/08 Nicolas Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and Others v. Gouvernement de la Communauté Française [2010] ECR I-2735 at [71].
216. A. Meuwese, Impact Assessment in EU Lawmaking (Kluwer 2008) 91.
217. A. Renda, Law and Economics in the RIA World (Intersentia 2011) 77-80.
218. Critical on the contemporary state of the methodology of IA.
219. G. Pincione and F. Tesón, Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation (Cambridge University Press 2006) 17.
220. J. Parkinson, Deliberating in the Real World (Oxford University Press 2006) 150.
221. A. Kocharov, 'Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Federalism without a Purpose?' in L. Azoulai et al., Deconstructing EU Federalism through Competences (2011).
222. EUI Working Paper Law 2012/6, 20 (applied to the exchange of reasoned opinions by National Parliaments).
223. J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice (Clarendon Press 1993) 12.
224. The added value of the IA in the policy process is also a direct causation of its methodological robustness.
225. J. Harrison and A. Goller, 'Trade and Human Rights: What Does 'Impact Assessment' Have to Offer?' (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 611.
226. Johnston warns for the potential dangers of an increased political mistrust by the national parliaments viz-à-viz the EU institutions, but identifies transparence and better communication as benefits.
227. A. Johnston, 'Euro-Visions? Some Thoughts on Prospects and Mechanisms for Future Constitutional Change in the European Union' in C. Barnard (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited (Oxford University Press 2007) 280-281.
228. V. Constantinesco, 'Les Compétences et le Principe de Subsidiarité' (2005) 41 Revue Trimesterielle de Droit Européen 316.
229. The substantive quality of the dialogue hence warrants attention, in a similar fashion as the intensity of judicial review.
230. The case study on the directive on patient rights in cross-border healthcare: Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Application of Patients' Rights in Cross-border Healthcare' COM (2008) 414 final.
231. P. Popelier and W. Vandenbruwaene, 'The Subsidiarity Mechanism as a Tool for Inter-Level Dialogue in Belgium: On "Regional Blindness" and Co-operative Flaws' (2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 209.
232. The impact assessment was cited as an argument and primary source for facts in almost all the answers from the Commission.
233. A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast, 'The Federal Order of Competences' in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 304.
234. E. Swaine, 'Subsidiarity and Self-interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice' (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal 1, 64.
235. Although the threshold was deemed obstructively high, it was attained in May 2012, relating to Commission, 'Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to Take Collective Action within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services' COM (2012) 130 final. Following Article 7 of the Protocol, the Commission is now obliged to review its proposal and to decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw it, giving reasons for its decision.
236. P. Kiiver, The Early Warning System for the Princple of Subsidiarity (Routledge 2012) 127.
237. On the legal quality of the Reasoned Opinions.
238. A. Alemanno, 'The Better Regulation Initiative at the Judicial Gate: A Trojan Horse within the Commission's Walls or the Way Forward?' (2009) 15 European Law Journal 382, 392-393.
239. E. Barbier de la Serre and A.-L. Sibony, 'Expert Evidence before the EC Courts' (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 941, 973-977.
240. E. Barbier de la Serre and A.-L. Sibony, 'Expert Evidence before the EC Courts' (2008) 45 Common Market Law Review 941, 981.
241. Article 24 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
242. A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and its Critique (Oxford University Press 2002) 156.
243. L. Corrias, The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice (Springer 2011) 151.
244. The literature mentioned in ft. 78 and accompanying text.
245. Case C-26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR I-12.
246. L. Azoulai, L. Boucon and F.-X. Millet, Deconstructing EU Federalism through Competences (2011) EUI Working Paper Law 2012/6, 1-4.
247. V. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (Oxford University Press 2010) 255.
248. M. Poiares Maduro, 'Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism' in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? (Cambridge University Press 2009) 356-357.
249. M. Poiares Maduro, 'Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism' in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? (Cambridge University Press 2009) 365.
250. A. Vermeule, The System of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 2011) 3.
251. Defining this notion of a constitutional order as a system of systems, that addresses the interaction between institutions or governmental actors, which are themselves aggregates of the individual interactions of their members.
252. D. Sarmiento, 'National Voice and European Loyalty' in H.W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (eds.), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia 2012) 336-337.
253. For an illustration the contrast between a binary and more subtle approach by the ECJ on questions of the review of national law with a constitutional dimension.
254. A. Alemanno, 'A Meeting of Minds on Impact Assessment: When Ex ante Evaluation Meets Ex post Judicial Control' (2011) 17(3) European Public Law 485, 496-505.
255. W. Voermans and Y. Schuurmans, 'Better Regulation by Appeal' (2011) 17(3) European Public Law 507, 511.
256. S. Weatherill, 'The Limits of Legislative Harmonization Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court's Caselaw Has Become a "Drafting Guide"' (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827, 850.
257. 'The case law [on EU competences] is a drafting guide for the legislature: the Court is empowering, not restraining.'.
258. J. Goldsworthy, 'Introduction' in J. Goldsworthy (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions (Oxford University Press 2006) 2.
259. The first is aimed at discovering the meaning and applying, which is different from the more creative and imaginary act of construction.
260. K. Whittington, Constitutional Construction (Harvard University Press 2001) 4-15.