Subsidiarity and Self-Interest: Federalism at the European Court of Justice

Harvard International Law Journal

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2000, Pages

  Swaine, Edward T ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0041724794     PISSN: 00178063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
2. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
3. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
4. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
5. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
6. See Ivo D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: An Agenda for Additional Research, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND POWER-SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 23 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1991) (noting that "students of federalism remain severely handicapped in their search for explanations by their failure to agree on what federalism is"); see also FREDERICK K. LISTER, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE REVIVAL OF CONFEDERAL GOVERNANCE 19 (1996) (observing that the estimated number of federal systems ranges from 4 to 44); Ingolf Pernice, Harmonization of Legislation in Federal Systems: Constitutional, Federal, and Subsidiarity Aspects, in HARMONIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: CONSTITUTIONAL, FEDERAL AND SUBSIDIARITY ASPECTS - THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIKA COMPARED 13 (Ingolf Pernice ed., 1996) (noting that as of 1984, some 497 different adjectives had already been employed before the term "federalism" in the scholarly literature). This Article employs the term broadly to facilitate comparison. See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263 (1990) ("Federalism is present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the common legal order."); see also Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution - The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 746, 747-52 (1998); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 n.5 (1994).
7. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339- 43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.
8. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339- 43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.
9. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339- 43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.
10. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339-43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.
11. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339- 43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.
12. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 34-58 (1995) (summarizing case to be made for strong national authority); id. at 75-106 (case for preserving state authority); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 378-412 (1997); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Subsidiarity, Harmonization, and Their Values: Convergence and Divergence in Europe and the United States, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 573, 574-76 (1996) (distinguishing between virtues of federalism in U.S. and European contexts). Compare, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339- 43 (1994) (summarizing values potentially promoted by subsidiarity), and ROBERT P. INMAN & DAVID L. RUBINFELD, SUBSIDIARITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 2-13 (NBER Working Paper 6556, May 1998) (same), and Kramer, supra note 1, with A.E. Dick Howard, The Values of Federalism, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 143, 156-60 (1993) (noting drawbacks to localism), and Edward L.