Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Halberstam, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Central judiciary; Comparative politics; Federalism; Integration; Judicial bias; Law; Subsidiarity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923610827     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0009     Document Type: Chapter

References (80)

1. ACKERMAN, B. 1991. We The People, vol. 1: Foundations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
2. BEDNAR, J. 2007. The Robust Federation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. BEDNAR, J., ESKRIDGE, Jr., W. N., and FEREJOHN, J. 2001. A Political Theory of Federalism. Pp. 223-67 in Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule, ed. J. Ferejohn, J. N. Rakove, and J. Riley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. BELLAMY, R., and SCHÖNLAU, J. 2004. The good, the bad and the ugly: the need for constitutional compromise and the drafting of the EU Constitution. Pp. 56-74 in Political Theory and the European Constitution, ed. L. Dobson and A. Folledal. New York: Routledge.
5. BERMANN, G. 1994. Taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and the United States. Columbia Law Review, 94: 331-456.
6. BRETON, A. 1996. Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory Of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. BURLEY, A. M., and MATTLI, W. 1993. Europe before the Court: a political theory of legal integration. International Organization, 47: 41-76.
8. BZDERA, A. 1993. Comparative analysis of federal high courts: a political theory of judicial review. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 26: 3-29.
9. CHOPER, J. H. 1980. Judicial Review and the National Political Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10. CHUBB, J. E. 1985. Federalism and the bias for centralization. Pp. 273-386 in The New Direction in American Politics, ed. J. E. Chubb and P. E. Peterson. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
11. COFFIN, F. M. 1980. The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the Federal Appellate Bench. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
12. DAHL, R. A. 1957. Decision making in a democracy: the Supreme Court as national policy-maker. Journal of Public Law, 6: 279-95.
13. DAHL, R. A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
14. DICEY, A. V. 1959. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th edn. London: MacMillan & Co.; originally published 1885.
15. ELAZAR, D. J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
16. ELSTER, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. New York: Cambridge University Press.
17. ESKRIDGE, Jr., W. N., and FEREJOHN, J. 1994. The elastic Commerce Clause: a political theory of American federalism. Vanderbilt Law Review, 47: 1355-400.
18. FILIPPOV, M., ORDESHOOK, P. C., and SHVETSOVA, O. 2004. Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
19. FLIGSTEIN, N., and STONE SWEET, A. 2002. Constructing polities and markets: an institutionalist account of European integration. American Journal of Sociology, 107: 1206-43.
20. FRIEDMAN, B. 2005. The politics of judicial review. Texas Law Review, 84: 257-337.
21. FRYMER, P., and YOON, A. 2002. Political parties, representation, and federal safeguards. Northwestern University Law Review, 96: 977-1026.
22. GARRETT, G. R., KELEMEN, D., and SCHULTZ, H. 1998. The European Court Of Justice, national governments, and legal integration in the European Union. International Organization, 52: 149-76.
23. GOLDSMITH, J. L. 1997. Federal courts, foreign affairs, and federalism. Virginia Law Review, 83: 1617-715.
24. GRODZINS, M. 1966. The American System: A New View of Government in the United States, ed. D. J. Elazar. Chicago: Rand McNally.
25. HABERMAS, J. 2002. Toward a European political community. Society, 39: 58-62.
26. HALBERSTAM, D. 2001a. The foreign affairs of federal systems: a national perspective on the benefits of state participation. Villanova Law Review, 46: 1015-68.
27. HALBERSTAM, D. 2001b. Comparative federalism and the issue of commandeering. Pp. 213-51 in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, ed. R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis. New York: Oxford University Press.
28. HALBERSTAM, D. 2004. Of power and responsibility: the political morality of federal systems. Virginia Law Review, 90: 732-834.
29. HALBERSTAM, D. 2005. The bride of Messina: constitutionalism and democracy in Europe. European Law Review, 30: 775-801.
30. HALBERSTAM, D. and HILLS, JR., R. M. 2001. State autonomy in Germany and the United States. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 574: 173-84.
31. HERZOG, D. 2000. Externalities and other parasites. University of Chicago Law Review, 67: 895-923.
32. HILLS, JR., R. M. 2000. Poverty, residency, and federalism: states' duty of impartiality toward newcomers. Supreme Court Review, 1999: 277-335.
33. HILLS, JR., R. M. 2005. Two Concepts of the Economic: The Underlying Unity of Federalism and Due Process Jurisprudence. Manuscript.
34. HIRSCHL, R. 2004. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
35. HOLMES, S. 1997. Precommitment and the paradox of democracy. Pp. 195-240 in Constitutionalism and Democracy, ed. J. Elster and R. Slagstad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
36. HOLMES, W. 1920. Collected Legal Papers. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
37. HOPKINS, W. J., 2002. Devolution in Context: Regional, Federal and Devolved Government in the Member States of the European Union. London: Cavendish.
38. KELEMEN, R. D. 2004. The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
39. KRAMER, L. D. 2004. The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. New York: Oxford University Press.
40. LEHMBRUCH, G. 1976. Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
41. LENAERTS, K. 1990. Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism. American Journal of Comparative Law, 38: 205-64.
42. LEVINSON, D. 2005. Empire-building government in constitutional law. Harvard Law Review, 118: 915-72.
43. LEVINSON, D. and PILDES, R. H. 2006. Separation of parties, not powers. Harvard Law Review, 119: 2311-86.
44. LIVINGSTON, W. S. 1956. Federalism and Constitutional Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
45. LLEWELLYN, K. N. 1960. The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals. Toronto: Little, Brown.
46. MC CONNELL, M. W. 1987. Federalism: evaluating the founders' design. University of Chicago Law Review, 54: 1484-512.
47. MADISON, J. 1787. The Federalist no. 10. Pp. 56-65 in The Federalist, ed. J. E. Cooke. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961.
48. MADISON, J. 1788. The Federalist no. 39. Pp. 250-7 in The Federalist, ed. J. E. Cooke. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961.
49. MADURO, M. P. 1998. We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution. Oxford: Hart.
50. MAJONE, G. 2001. Two logics of delegation: agency and fiduciary relations in EU governance. European Union Politics, 2: 103-22.
51. NICOLAIDIS, K. 2001. Conclusion: the federal vision beyond the federal state. Pp. 439-81 in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union, ed. K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52. OETER, S. 1998a. Artikel 72. Pp. 1795-1864 in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, H. v. Mangoldt, F. Kilen. Munich: Verlag Franz Vahlen.
53. OETER, S. 1998b. Integration und Subsidiarität im Deutschen Bundesstaatsrecht, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
54. POSNER, R. A. 1993. What do judges and justices maximize? (The same thing everyone else does). Supreme Court Economic Review, 3: 1-41.
55. RAMSEYER, M. 1994. The puzzling (in)dependence of courts: a comparative approach. Journal of Legal Studies, 23: 721-47.
56. REGAN, D. 1986. The Supreme Court and state protectionism: making sense of the dormant commerce clause. Michigan Law Review, 84: 1091-287.
57. REHNQUIST, W. 1999. 1998 year-end report of the federal judiciary. Third Branch: Newsletter of the Federal Courts, 31(1): 2-3.
58. RIKER, W. H. 1955. The Senate and American federalism. American Political Science Review, 49: 452-69.
59. RIKER, W. H. 1975. Federalism. Pp. 93-172 in Governmental Institutions and Processes, ed. F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
60. SCHARPF, F. W. 1988. The joint-decision trap: lessons from German federalism and European integration. Public Administration, 66: 239-78.
61. SCHARPF, F. W., REISSERT, B., and SCHNABEL, F. 1976. Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik. Kronberg: Scriptor.
62. SEGAL, J. A., and SPAETH, H. J. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
63. SHAPIRO, M. 1981. Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
64. SHAPIRO, M. 2002. The success of judicial review and democracy. Pp. 149-183 in On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, ed. M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet. New York: Oxford University Press.
65. SLAUGHTER, A.-M., STONE SWEET, A., and WEILER, J. H. H. (eds.) 1998. The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence Legal Change in Its Social Context. Oxford: Hart.
66. SOLBERG, R. S., and LINDQUIST, S. A. 2006. Activism, ideology, and federalism: judicial behavior in constitutional challenges before the Rehnquist Court, 1986-2000. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 3: 237-61.
67. SPIRO, P. J. 1999. Foreign relations federalism. University of Colorado Law Review, 70: 1223-61.
68. STEIN, E. 1981. Lawyers, judges, and the making of a transnational constitution. American Journal of International Law, 75: 1-27.
69. STEPAN, A. 1999, Federalism and democracy: beyond the U.S. model. Journal of Democracy, 10: 19-34.
70. STONE SWEET, A. 2004. The Judicial Construction of Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.
71. SUNSTEIN, C. 1995. Incompletely theorized agreements. Harvard Law Review, 108: 1733-72.
72. TARNOPOLSKY, W. S. (ed.) 1975. The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2nd rev. edn. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.
73. THAYER, J. B. 1893. The origin and scope of the American doctrine of constitutional law. Harvard Law Review, 7: 129-56.
74. TRIBE, L. H. 1980. The puzzling persistence of process-based constitutional theories. Yale Law Journal, 89: 1063-4.
75. TSEBELIS, G. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
76. TUSHNET, M. 1999. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
77. WECHSLER, H. 1954. The political safeguards of federalism: the role of the states in the composition and selection of the national government. Columbia Law Review, 54: 543-60.
78. WHEARE, K. C. 1964. Federal Government, 4th edn. New York: Oxford University Press.
79. WHITTINGTON, K. E. 2001. Taking what they give us: explaining the Court's federalism offensive. Duke Law Journal, 51: 477-521.
80. WHITTINGTON, K. E. 2004. Crossing over: citation of public law faculty in law reviews. Law and Courts, 14: 5-10.