constitutional heterarchy: The centrality of conflict in the european union and the united states

Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 326-355

  Halberstam, Daniel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84928426779     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511627088.012     Document Type: Chapter

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