The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

Cognitive Science

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 544-577

  Banks, Adrian P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Atomic Components of Thought Rational; Belief bias; Dual process theory; Relational reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875617379     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12017     Document Type: Article

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