The effects of legal reforms on the ownership structure of listed companies

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 427-458

  Cuomo, Francesca ^a   Zattoni, Alessandro ^b,c   Valentini, Giovanni ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NAPLES PARTHENOPE   (Italy)

^c BOCCONI UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORPORATE STRATEGY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE; LEGAL SYSTEM; OWNERSHIP;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84875603076     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: 14643650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/dts015     Document Type: Article

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