Foundations for contest success functions

Economic Theory

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 81-98

  Corchón, Luis ^a   Dahm, Matthias ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bargaining with claims; Contest success function; Endogenous contests; Nash bargaining solution

Indexed keywords

EID: 77950458066     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0425-x     Document Type: Article

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