Understanding the hold-up problem in the management of megaprojects: The case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project

International Journal of Project Management

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 628-637

  Chang, Chen Yu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Hold up; Private finance initiative; Quasi rent; Renegotiation; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

PRIVATIZATION; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

HOLD UP; PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE; QUASI-RENT; RENEGOTIATION; TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS;

RAILROAD TUNNELS;

GOVERNMENT; NUMERICAL MODEL; PROJECT MANAGEMENT; QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS; TUNNEL;

UNITED KINGDOM;

EID: 84875102703     PISSN: 02637863     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijproman.2012.10.012     Document Type: Article

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