Towards an approach for measuring the risk-bearing capacity of construction contracts

Proceedings of the 1st International Technology Management Conference, ITMC 2011

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 501-509

  Chang, Chen Yu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT; CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS; DECISION AIDING; DIRECT MEASUREMENT; NOVEL CONCEPT; QUANTITATIVE MEASURES; RISK EXPOSURE;

BEARING CAPACITY; BEARINGS (STRUCTURAL); CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT; RISK MANAGEMENT;

PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 80052973781     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/ITMC.2011.5996019     Document Type: Conference Paper

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