Building and managing facilities for public services

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 90, Issue 10-11, 2006, Pages 2143-2160

  Bennett, John ^a   Iossa, Elisabetta ^b,c  

^a BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b BRUNEL UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Incomplete contracts; Integration versus separation; Private Finance Initiative (PFI); Public private partnerships; Residual value

Indexed keywords

EID: 33748046785     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.04.001     Document Type: Article

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