Reversal of bargaining power in construction projects: Meaning, existence and implications

Construction Management and Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 845-855

  Chang, Chen Yu ^a   Ive, Graham ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asset specificity; Bargaining power; Opportunism; Procurement; Transaction cost

Indexed keywords

ASSET MANAGEMENT; COSTS; FINANCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

ASSET SPECIFITY; BARGAINING POWER; CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS; PROCUREMENT; TRANSACTION COST;

CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY;

BARGAINING; CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 34547992411     PISSN: 01446193     EISSN: 1466433X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01446190601164113     Document Type: Article

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