A Lower Bound of 1+φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms

Algorithmica

Volumn 66, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 211-223

  Koutsoupias, Elias ^a   Vidali, Angelina ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Algorithmic Game Theory; Dominant strategies; Lower bound; Mechanism design; Multiparameter mechanism design; Scheduling unrelated machines; Truthful

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY; DOMINANT STRATEGY; LOWER BOUNDS; MECHANISM DESIGN; TRUTHFUL; UNRELATED MACHINES;

GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; SCHEDULING ALGORITHMS;

SCHEDULING;

EID: 84874645027     PISSN: 01784617     EISSN: 14320541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-012-9634-6     Document Type: Article

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