Organizing insurgency: Networks, resources, and rebellion in South Asia

International Security

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 142-177

  Staniland, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84874501550     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00091     Document Type: Article

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51. My approach is different from JeremyWeinstein's influential theory, which argues that there is a distinction between groups built around networks and those built around resources. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, p. 50. My argument is that all groups have some social underpinning and some resource endowments: the crucial issue is how they interact.
52. Anoop Sarbahi, "Insurgent-Population Ties and the Variation in the Trajectory of Peripheral Civil Wars," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. Sarbahi contrasts "anchored" and "floating" armed groups, but focuses on the overall political trajectories of peripheral conflicts, whereas this article explores patterns of organizational cohesion and internal control. 2011
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58. Crucially, it is possible to observe differences between prewar social bases and wartime insurgent organizations: the functions and forms differ dramatically, and there is space for other theories to operate in ways that undermine continuity between prewar collective action and wartime institutions. My theory can therefore be disconrmed. One can also measure social bases independently of any future war.
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64. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
65. McCarthy, "Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing," p. 147.
66. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
67. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Antonio Giustozzi, "Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 9 (September 2010), pp. 836-853.
68. Roger V. Gould's evocative words, a deep structure to human conflict that is masked by observable cultural variation." Gould, Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity about Social Rank Breeds Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 101.
69. The political salience of social ties will differ: many prewar networks and organizations cannot be linked to an insurgent political agenda. Here, I study social ties that are relevant to rebellion and assess the impact of their structure on organizations.
70. Paul Staniland, "Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse," University of Chicago, 2012.
71. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,", Explaining Instititutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power in Mahoney and Thelen, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 15-17.
72. Integrated and fragmented organizations are not the only types of insurgent organizations that exist, but for the purposes of this article, they represent useful extremes.
73. Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 21.
74. Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks," Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11 (June 2008), pp. 539-561
75. Paul D. Kenny, "Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma," International Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 533-555
76. Claire Metelits, Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior (New York: New York University Press, 2010).
77. Staniland, "Networks of Rebellion." The most important changes over time should arise from shifts in underlying social coalitions and linkages, whether through the formation or the destruction of vertical and horizontal ties undergirding formal institutions.
78. Chester Irving Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938)
79. Ronald Burt, Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992)
80. David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,", Perspectives on Positive Political Economy in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90-143
81. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957).
82. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, pp. 260-265
83. He writes that "if a group manages to maintain selective recruitment.. the leadership can protect the long-term orientation of the membership" (p. 263), but he does not systematically explain when one should expect this outcome other than in cases of contingent leadership. He concludes that overall "it is more likely that activist groups will turn into opportunistic organizations than vice versa" By contrast, I argue that foundational networks should indicate how recruitment will be carried out and how institutions will be structured over time, unless there is a shift in the social ties that underpin formal organization. 264
84. Kathleen Cunningham, Kristin Bakke, and Lee Seymour, "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, prepublished February 29, 2012, DOI:10.1177/0022002711429697
85. Cunningham, "Veto Players and Civil War Duration"
86. Pearlman, "Spoiling Inside and Out"
87. Theodore McLauchlin and Wendy Pearlman, "Out-group Conflict, Ingroup Unity? Exploring the Effect of Repression on Intra-movement Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, prepublished December 25, 2011, DOI:10.1177/0022002711429669
88. Lawrence, "Triggering Nationalist Violence."
89. Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 220.
90. Ross, "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War?"
91. Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 259-279
92. Sidney Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2007), p. 596.
93. This article does not consider the Pakistani groups that came to dominate the insurgency by the late 1990s, including Harakatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mujahideen. I focus on tight comparisons across indigenous groups within a difcult military environment. Unlike the Pakistani organizations, which were built in and drew manpower from a friendly Pakistan, the indigenous groups recruited and operated in areas where the Indian security forces were contesting their power. This created fundamentally different organizational challenges.
94. Paul Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010.
95. Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore: Mashal, 2004)
96. Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007)
97. Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New York: Melville House, 2009).
98. Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007)
99. Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), chaps. 1-2.
100. Violence continues, but it is at a low level and primarily carried out by the Pakistani groups, not the indigenous organizations that are the focus of this study.
101. Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties (New Delhi: Penguin, 1999), p. 52.
102. Bose, Kashmir, p. 125.
103. Sumantra Bose, "JKLF and JKHM: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Jammu and Kashmir Hizb-ul Mujahideen," in Tirman, Heiberg, and O'Leary, Terror, Insurgency, and the State, p. 240.
104. "Tanzeem" is a word for armed group in this context.
105. Byman, Deadly Connections, pp. 166-186.
106. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 86.
107. Iffat Malik, Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 298.
108. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," p. 233.
109. Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 179.
110. Jamal, Shadow War, p. 123.
111. Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76-107.
112. David Devadas, In Search of a Future: The Story of Kashmir (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007), p. 159.
113. Malik, Kashmir, p. 300
114. Jonah Blank, "Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (December 1999), p. 40.
115. Balraj Puri, Kashmir towards Insurgency (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993), p. 4.
116. Ashutosh Varshney, "Three Compromised Nationalisms: Why Kashmir Has Been a Problem," ., Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia In Raju G.C. Thomas, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992), p. 221
117. Julian Schoeld and Reeta Tremblay, "Why Pakistan Failed: Tribal Focoism in Kashmir," Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (March 2008), p. 33.
118. Sati Sahni, Kashmir Underground (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), p. 37
119. Harinder Baweja, "The War Within," India Today, July 15, 1994.
120. "Till Freedom Come," Outlook, October 18, 1995.
121. Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 168.
122. Azam Inquilabi, A rather nomadic early JKLF/Al Fatah/People's League member, claims to have arranged their meeting with Amanullah Khan in Muzaffarabad apparently, they simply (New Delhi: Parity "Approached me for initiation into the gun culture." Quoted in Pradeep Thakur, Militant Monologues: Echoes from the Kashmir Valley, 2003), p. 35.
123. Thakur, Militant Monologues, pp. 121-122.
124. A.G. Noorani, "Contours of Militancy," Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 20 (September/October 2000).
125. P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads (Delhi: Vikas, 1994), p. 277.
126. For instance, Devadas suggests thatWaza, an early faction leader Devadas, In Search of a Future, "Had no time to indoctrinate every bunch of boys.", p. 162.
127. Praveen Swami, "Crime as Business," Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 2000), http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl1701/17010160.htm.
128. Devadas places him as joining JKLF in early 1988, just as the mobilization was beginning. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 160.
129. A.G. Noorani, "The Betrayal of Kashmir: Pakistan's Duplicity and India's Complicity," in Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir, p. 263.
130. Taimur Siddiqui, "A Prole in Passion," Newsline, February 2001, p. 34.
131. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 164.
132. Sinha suggests that "when the militants had arrived in 'azaad' Kashmir, they had arrived together. Yet when they sat down to discuss matters, there [were] disagreements, and they came apart." Aditya Sinha, Death of Dreams: A Terrorist's Tale (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 45.
133. Author interview, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, May 2008.
134. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 164.
135. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," pp. 240-241.
136. Noorani, "The Betrayal of Kashmir," p. 263
137. Siddiqui, "A Prole in Passion," p. 34.
138. Alexander Evans, "Kashmir: The Past Ten Years," Asian Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 49.
139. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 181
140. Sahni, Kashmir Underground, p. 44.
141. Baweja, "A Calculated Gamble," India Today, June 15, 1994, p. 67.
142. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 49.
143. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," p. 237.
144. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 90.
145. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 214
146. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion Several future Hizbul Mujahideen commanders and Jamaat members, including Maqbool Ilahi and Mohammed Ashraf Dar, were also trained by the JKLF, as was Abdul Bangroo, who later became a key member of Nasir-ul Islam, pp. 49-51..
147. Sumit Ganguly, "Slow Learning: Lessons from India's Counterinsurgency Operations in Kashmir,", India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned in David Fidler and Ganguly, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 79-88.
148. Bose, Kashmir, p. 126.
149. There were social gaps between the Kashmir JKLF and its British diaspora because of the primarily Mirpuri composition (from PJK) of the latter.
150. Sten Widmalm, Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 132.
151. Harinder Baweja, "Losing Control," India Today, May 31, 1993, p. 41.
152. This split was between Amanullah Khan in PJK and Yasin Malik in IJK; a bloc of JKLF members in IJK led by Shabbir Siddiqui remained loyal to Khan but were wiped out in 1996.
153. Yoginder Sikand, "The Emergence and Development of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s-1990)," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (July 2002), p. 748.
154. "JKLF Splits for Second Time," Indian Express, October 31, 2002.
155. Navnita Chadha Behera, State, Identity, and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), p. 204.
156. Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), p. 154
157. Noorani, "Contours of Militancy" Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, p. 440
158. Varshney, "Three Compromised Nationalisms," p. 221.
159. Author interview, Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, May 2008.
160. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," p. 243.
161. Devadas, In Search of a Future, pp. 77-115
162. Sikand, "The Emergence and Development of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s- 1990s)," p. 720
163. G.N. Gauhar, "Jamat-I-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,", Conflict and Politics of Jammu and Kashmir: Internal Dynamics in Avineet Prashar and Paawan Vivek, eds. (Jammu: Saksham, 2007), p. 77.
164. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 11
165. Malik, Kashmir, p. 270.
166. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
167. Basharat Peer, Curfewed Night: One Kashmiri Journalist's Frontline Account of Life, Love, and War in His Homeland (Noida: Random House India, 2008), p. 183
168. Gauhar, "Jamat-I-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir," p. 81
169. Sahni, Kashmir Underground, p. 122
170. Sikand, "The Emergence and Development of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s-1990s)," p. 710.
171. Bose, Kashmir, p. 130.
172. Peer, Curfewed Night, p. 186.
173. Bose, Kashmir, p. 234.
174. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 48
175. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 180.
176. Muzamil Jaleel, "Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul," Indian Express, May 22, 2003.
177. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 237.
178. Jaleel, "Spawning Militancy."
179. Robert Oakley, Former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, argued that the "Jamaat, for one, has been very active."
180. Shekhar Gupta, "The ISI Has Hurt Pakistan," India Today, May 15, 1994, p. 53.
181. This is drawn from numerous author interviews in New Delhi, India, and Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir 2007-11,.
182. Jaleel, "Spawning Militancy." "Jamat" is an alternative spelling for "Jamaat." See also Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad, p. 178.
183. "The Tanzeems and Their Leaders," Frontline, September 19, 2000
184. Siddiqui, "A Prole in Passion," pp. 33-34.
185. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 187.
186. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," p. 235.
187. Devadas, In Search of a Future, p. 240.
188. Thakur, Militant Monologues, p. 127.
189. Behera, State, Identity, and Violence, pp. 178-179.
190. Amelie Blom, "A Patron-Client Perspective on Militia-State Relations: The Case of the Hizbul- Mujahidin of Kashmir,", Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists, and Separatists in Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 146.
191. Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi: Viking, 1995), p. 235.
192. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 48-124.
193. Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 2012), pp. 16-40.
194. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 86.
195. Blom, "A Patron-Client Perspective on Militia-State Relations," p. 143.
196. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 51
197. K.V. Krishna Rao, The Genesis of the Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the North East, and Future Prospects (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India, 1997), p. 42.
198. Bose, "JKLF and JKHM," p. 247
199. Blom, "A Patron-Client Perspective on Militia-State Relations," p. 150.
200. Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups."
201. Joshi, The Lost Rebellion, p. 78.
202. Sinha, Death of Dreams, is the biography of MJF's leader, and it shows how the organizations faltered and collapsed. The political interpretations are not necessarily very credible, but the factual information is useful.
203. Ganguly, "Slow Learning"
204. Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place."
205. Bose, Kashmir, p. 126
206. Author interviews in Srinagar in Jammu and Kashmir in indicate that Al Umar was seen as an unpredictable, predatory, and undisciplined organization. 2008 and 2009
207. Jamal notes that "Hizbul Mujahideen opposed the ISI's move to fracture the militant movements." Jamal, Shadow War, p. 150.
208. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, pp. 113-150.
209. Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia University Press 2005), p. 93.
210. As Dorronsoro argues, "[T]he social origin of its ofcials showed a high level of uniformity, and this consistency of membership was the source of the movement's unity." Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending. This is a case of social bases being transformed in war through the massive social dislocations of the 1980s; however, it was unintentional and involuntary. 273
211. Thomas Ruttig, "How Tribal Are the Taleban?" (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2010), p. 2, http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf.
212. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 33.
213. Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), pp. 194-195
214. Rashid, Taliban, pp. 223-224.
215. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 211-213, 220-221. An overview of the 1980s mujahideen can be found in Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, chap. 6.
216. Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: War and Warlords of Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
217. Fotini Christia, "The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the Afghan and Bosnian Civil Wars," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2008.
218. Sanjoy Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India's Northeast (New Delhi: Viking, 1994
219. Sarbahi, "Insurgent Population Ties and the Variation in the Trajectory of Peripheral Civil Wars," also shows that resource endowments alone do not explain their behavior or state responses to them.
220. C. Christine Fair, "Lessons from India's Experience in the Punjab, 1978-1993," in Ganguly and Fidler, India and Counterinsurgency, pp. 107-126.
221. Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1994)
222. Chris Smith, "The LTTE: A National Liberation and Oppression Movement," in Gayer and Jaffrelot, Armed Militias of South Asia, p. 93
223. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), pp. 20-24.
224. Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," p. 140
225. Brendan O'Duffy, "LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," in Tirman, Heiberg, and O'Leary, Terror, Insurgency, and the State, p. 272.
226. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, p. 331.
227. Will Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 160.
228. As Sidney Tarrow notes, Tarrow, "Inside Insurgencies," (emphasis in original). A given stock of resources is not meaningful on its own terms. 596 [I]t is not quantities but interactions that are the key to the dynamics of violence in civil wars
229. Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009
230. Dan Slater, However, notes that in the state-building context, "Elites must be effectively arranged and capable insti tutions must be constructed before any predictable system of public provision can be effectively implemented." Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 11-12
231. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
232. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War" Goodwin, No Other Way Out
233. Lawrence, "Triggering Nationalist Violence"
234. Paul Staniland, "Cities on Fire: Social Mobilization, State Policy, and Urban Insurgency," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 43, No. 12 (December 2010), pp. 1623-1649.
235. Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)
236. Martin Shefter, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994)
237. Benjamin Smith, Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
238. David Carter, "A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups," International Organization, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 129-151.
239. Gutiérrez Sanín, "Telling the Difference," pp. 27-29.
240. International Crisis Group, Middle East Report, No. 55, July 11, 2006 Iraq's Muqtada Al- Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?.
241. International Crisis Group, No. 70, November 15, 2007. "Shiite Politics in Iraq," Middle East Report
242. Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, pp. 150-151.