Triggering nationalist violence: Competition and conflict in uprisings against colonial rule

International Security

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 88-122

  Lawrence, Adria ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77958468111     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00019     Document Type: Article

References (238)

1. For examples, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in CivilWar" (Oxford: Center for the Study of African Economics, March 2002)
2. Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is a Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004), pp. 814-858.
3. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
4. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
5. See, for example, Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
6. Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).
7. See, for example, Rui J.P. de Figueiredo Jr. and Barry R. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," in Barbara F.Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261-298.
8. Elisabeth Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
9. On terrorism, see Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," in Catherine Besteman, ed., Violence: A Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2002), pp. 99-117.
10. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005)
11. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005).
12. On sexual violence, see Elizabeth Jean Wood, "Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare?" Politics and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 131-161.
13. On riots, see Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
14. Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003).
15. Steven I. Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
16. See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"
17. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
18. These studies identify places with large-scale violence, but they have little to say about why violence is preferable to alternatives or when war erupts. In "The Rationality of Fear," de Figueiredo and Weingast highlight the importance of theories that account for the timing of violence.
19. For more on the rise of intrastate violence and the decline of major war, see Erica Chenoweth and Adria Lawrence, eds., Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).
20. John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
21. Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J. David Singer, "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 49-70.
22. See Hendrik Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).
23. In the mid-twentieth century, the French encountered peaceful nationalist mobilization in the majority of the empire, including: Cambodia, Chad, the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Djibouti, French Guinea, French Sudan, Gabon, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Middle Congo (now Republic of the Congo), Niger, Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic), Senegal, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and Togo. Violence erupted in Algeria, Cameroon, Madagascar, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Vietnam.
24. On the importance of case studies for understanding the processes that lead to civil war, see Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of CivilWar," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 2004), pp. 259-279.
25. Nationalist movement refers to the larger group of those issuing nationalist demands. The movement may be synonymous with one organization, where there is a dominant nationalist organization such as the Istiqlal (Independence) Party in Morocco until 1952, or it may include multiple groups and organizations.
26. See Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"
27. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
28. The literature on civil war onset is relevant to the French Empire given that all but one of the seven violent cases (Syria) reached the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths and are included in Fearon and Laitin's data set
29. Fearon and Laitin state that their theory should apply to anticolonial wars; from a theoretical standpoint, general explanations of onset may well apply across different kinds of wars
30. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," p. 76.
31. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
32. For a critique of the state capacity argument, see Matthew Adam Kocher, "Insurgency, State Capacity, and the Rural Basis of Civil War," paper presented at the Program on Order, Conflict, and Violence, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, October 31, 2007
33. Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War."
34. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War
35. The cases that did not have continuous GDP/capita data for four years prior to onset were either those in which data on GDP/capita were not measured at all or those that lacked GDP/capita data prior to onset. These included a number of cases that experienced civil war onset at or soon after independence, which is when they were added to the data set.
36. In such cases, GDP/capita was sometimes measured during the year of onset rather than prior to it, and may thus be endogenous to violence. Cases in which another civil war onset had occurred in the same country fewer than five years earlier were also eliminated because changes in GDP/capita may be endogenous to the earlier civil war onset.
37. See Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel, "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 2010), pp. 3-57.
38. They point out that the correlation between poverty and civil war may be a function of the consequences of civil war for poverty. State capacity measured in other ways may be similarly endogenous to conflict, as capacity erodes rapidly once violence has begun.
39. The variance among these cases is also roughly constant in the four years prior to onset. Moreover, about 63 percent of these cases experienced growth in real per capita GDP in the year immediately prior to onset; the percentage of these economies that were growing in the prior three years was, respectively, 71 percent, 64 percent, and 60 percent.
40. In other words, on average the level of poverty did not change much in the years prior to civil war onset; to the extent it did, the changes were typically in the direction of less poverty. Analysis was carried out using Stata 11, and is available from the author upon request.
41. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).
42. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)
43. See Blattman and Miguel, "Civil War"
44. Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 4 (August 2006), pp. 508-535.
45. Fearon and Laitin likewise do not find a significant correlation between GDP growth and civil war onset
46. See Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War."
47. Others have argued that it is not economic variables that matter, but changes in the regime. Hybrid regimes dubbed "anocracies," or regimes in transition, have been found to be more violent.
48. See Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992," American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No 1 (March 2001), pp. 33-48.
49. This finding, however, has been shown to be problematic because of the conflation of anocracy with already-existing political violence
50. See James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (June 2008), pp. 401-425.
51. Quantitative studies face serious measurement problems, as good indicators of state capacity or fluctuations in state capacity are notoriously difficult to come by and subject to critiques of endogeneity. Measurement issues are one reason why case study approaches are a useful way forward.
52. See Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War."
53. See, respectively, Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War"
54. Matthew Adam Kocher, "Human Ecology and Civil War," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2004.
55. Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 2007), pp. 173-185.
56. Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War"
57. Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).
58. Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," pp. 86, 77.
59. See also Andreas Wimmer and Brian Min, "From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816-2001," American Sociological Review, Vol. 71, No. 6 (December 2006), pp. 867-897.
60. They find that the transition from empire to nation-state is a particularly violent process
61. The inequalities of colonial rule and the privileged position of settlers likely produced resentment and a sense of deprivation, factors that scholars have associated with violence
62. See Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
63. Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
64. On grievances in situations of foreign occupation, see David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010)
65. Pape, Dying to Win
66. Sambanis, "What Is a Civil War?" p. 827.
67. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1963), p. 73.
68. See Raymond F. Betts, France and Decolonisation 1900-1960 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 6.
69. Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (London: Longman, 1994), p. 1.
70. Spruyt, Ending Empire, who argues that the inability of the French to decolonize explains violence in the empire
71. Abderrahim Ouardighi, La grande crise Franco-Marocaine, 1952-1956 (Rabat: L'Imprimerie Nouvelle, 1976), p. 57.
72. Indeed, in contemporary cases, nationalist groups often explicitly draw an analogy to colonial rule, articulating their grievances by suggesting that they are victims of colonial or neocolonial states
73. One response to this critique is that violence may have broken out only where imperial rule was most intransigent. The problem with this claim is that intransigence itself is often measured by whether or not there was a violent conflict, rather than through ex ante indicators of the colonial power's commitment to specific colonies.
74. Elsewhere, I have analyzed three measures of intransigence that do not appear to account for patterns of violence: length of time under colonial rule, percentage of settlers, and territorial status. These measures are also fairly stable and unsuited to explaining timing.
75. See Adria Lawrence, "Driven to Arms? The Escalation to Violence in Nationalist Conflicts," in Chenoweth and Lawrence, Rethinking Violence, chap. 6.
76. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 8.
77. Skocpol and Huntington, discussed above, likewise exemplify a focus on social changes and could equally be discussed in this section; I include them in the discussion of state capacity because of their substantive relevance to those arguments
78. See Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions
79. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
80. See Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions
81. Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
82. Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
83. Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
84. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p. 10.
85. William A. Gamson and David S. Meyer, "Framing Political Opportunity," in ibid., p. 275.
86. See Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions
87. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World
88. Barry R. Posen points to state collapse as a trigger of ethnic conflict, in particular, but in the French Empire, violence did not occur in the context of anarchy.
89. See Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27-47.
90. Jeff Goodwin, No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
91. Generalized repression, however, can have various effects: it may prompt opposition, or it may prevent opposition by raising the costs of collective action
92. For the various effects of repression on violence, see, for example, Douglas A. Hibbs Jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1973).
93. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978)
94. Edward N. Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence: ARational Action Approach," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 624-651.
95. Will H. Moore, "Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 851-873.
96. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, "How 'Free' Is Free Riding in CivilWars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem," World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 2 (January 2007), pp. 177-216.
97. Other studies have considered the ability of moderates to restrain extremists, arguing that extremists often act as spoilers during negotiations
98. See, for example, Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 263-296.
99. Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, eds., Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution (New York: United Nations University Press, 2006).
100. This argument explains violence during negotiations, but not at other times
101. For an alternative argument that terrorism rises when moderates accept concessions, see Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 145-176.
102. On violence and the desire for recognition, see Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," p. 107.
103. For more on outbidding, see Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
104. Bloom, Dying to Kill
105. On the ubiquity of intragroup violence alongside intergroup violence in civil wars, see Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, p. 387.
106. Kalyvas argues that in wartime, people denounce others out of personal (and often petty) motivations, but motivations can also be political
107. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," pp. 104-105, suggests that terrorism is used by elites who cannot mobilize mass support.
108. I draw on a sample of monthly French colonial reports prior to leadership repression found in Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (SHAT), Vincennes, France
109. The French worried about movements in their territories that followed Gandhi's example. More generally, peaceful mass movements may be more threatening than violent ones.
110. See Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 7-44.
111. Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October-December 2009), pp. 719-755.
112. French archives reveal the administration's confusion over the effects of repression on nationalist opposition; sometimes reports suggest that it served to suppress the movement, whereas other reports point to its counterproductive effects
113. See the Bulletins de Renseignments Politiques, in SHAT 3H1415 and 3H1416
114. A close reading of classified monthly reports from the French administration in Morocco shows no prior knowledge of the armed groups that would come to the fore in the violent phase of the nationalist resistance; the reports focused entirely on the actions of the main nationalist party, which did not turn violent in the aftermath of leadership repression
115. See ibid. Likewise, in Algeria the leaders of the FLN were unknown to the administration prior to its first action in 1954.
116. See Alistaire Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 86.
117. Communiqué No. 1 de l'Armée de Libération du Maghreb Arabe (et Mouvement de Résistance du Maroc Front de Libération Nationale Algérien), Tetouan, October 3, 1955.
118. reproduced in Brahim Tahiri, Le temps des anciens: Mémoires-clandestinité-récits Armée de Libération Marocaine (Rabat: Imprimerie Omnia, 2003), pp. 277-278.
119. Mohammed Zade, "Résistance et Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956): De l'action politique à la lutte armée: Rupture ou continuité?" Ph.D dissertation, Université Nice-Antipolis, 2001.
120. Interview by author, February 2006. Name withheld at request of respondent, a former member of the urban resistance.
121. Rom Landau, Moroccan Drama: 1900-1955 (San Francisco, Calif.: American Academy of Asian Studies, 1956), p. 201.
122. See, for example, Stéphane Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, 1943-1956 (Brussels: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1963), p. 192.
123. David M. Hart, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), p. 423.
124. Larbi Essakali, 1953-1983: Dans le concert des nations, Vol. 7 (Rabat: Nord Organisation, 1985), pp. 16-17.
125. Bernard Lugan, Histoire du Maroc des origines à nos jours (Paris: Perrin, 2000)
126. Selma Lazraq, La France et le retour de Mohammed V (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2003)
127. The view that the sultan's exile was the primary motivation for anticolonial violence has been promoted by the monarchy in the postcolonial era, and the date of the deposition remains a state holiday
128. Gilbert Grandval, Ma mission au Maroc (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1956), p. 21.
129. Quoted in Essakali, 1953-1983: Dans le concert des nations, p. 19.
130. From 1944 to 1953, the main rival of the Istiqlal Party was the Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance, which had far fewer members and pressured the French via diplomacy and the media. Hostility between the two parties prevented a unified front, despite an agreement in Tangier in April 1951.
131. A Moroccan communist party also existed, but had few members. Le Nationalisme Marocain, 1952, in SHAT, 3H1417.
132. Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, 1943-1956
133. See Adria Lawrence, "Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007.
134. Mobilization data were compiled from classified monthly and biweekly reports issued by the protectorate
135. On earlier nationalist activity, see Allal al-Fasi, The Independence Movements in Arab North Africa, trans. Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh (New York: Octagon, 1970).
136. Charles-André Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche: Nationalismes musulmans et souveraineté française (Tunis: Cérès Editions, 1972)
137. William A. Hoisington Jr., The Casablanca Connection: French Colonial Policy, 1936-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1984).
138. Abd al-Krim Rhilaab, Taariqh alharakat al-wataniyya bi'l maghrib, Vol. 1 (Casablanca: Al-Nejaah, 2000).
139. Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, p. 583.
140. The trade union was called the Union Générale des Syndicats Confédérés au Maroc, and was an affiliate of the French Conféderation Générale de Travail
141. See Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, pp. 108-120.
142. Bulletin de Renseignements Politiques Décembre 1952, in SHAT, 3H1416
143. Ouardighi, La grand crise Franco-Marocaine, p. 76, reports that French Resident General August-Léon Guillaume affirmed the need to eliminate both the party and the sultan.
144. Ouardighi, La grand crise Franco-Marocaine, p. 76, reports that French Resident General August-Léon Guillaume affirmed the need to eliminate both the party and the sultan.
145. Landau, Moroccan Drama, p. 323.
146. Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, p. 121.
147. John Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite-A Study in Segmented Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 47.
148. Guy Delanoë, Le retour du roi et l'indépendance retrouvée, Vol. 3 (Paris: Éditions l'Harmattan, 1991).
149. Zade, "Résistance et Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956)."
150. Blair, Western Window in the Arab World, pp. 169-170.
151. Barnett Singer and John Langdon, Cultured Force: Makers and Defenders of the French Colonial Empire (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 266.
152. Hart, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, p. 424, suggests that there were several armies of liberation, not one.
153. Quoted in Abderrahim Ouardighi, Mémoires d'un ancien résistant, 1953-1956 (Rabat: Le Haut commissariat aux anciens résistants et anciens membres de l'armée de libération), p. 60.
154. Nadir Bouzar, L'armée de libération nationale marocain: Retour sans visa (journal d'un résistant maghrébin) (Paris: Editions Publisud, 2002), p. 18.
155. The ALM claimed to have the backing of exiled Istiqlal leader Allal al-Fasi, but the party stated that although the ALM may have been inspired by al-Fasi, no party member supported the insurgency
156. Quoted in Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, p. 216.
157. John Waterbury, North for the Trade: The Life and Times of a Berber Merchant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 127.
158. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, p. 52.
159. Abderrahim Ouardighi, L'Itinéraire d'un nationaliste: Mehdi Ben Barka, 1920-1965 (Rabat: Editions Moncho, 1982), p. 48.
160. Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, pp. 194-195.
161. Ouardighi, Mémoires d'un ancien résistant, p. 90.
162. Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, p. 193.
163. Essakali, 1953-1983: Dans le concert des nations, p. 27.
164. Bernard, Le conflit Franco-Marocain, p. 193.
165. See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War
166. If the French had been trying to maintain control over Morocco, one might expect Moroccans to be targeted for the purpose Kalyvas lays out: to encourage defections and generate control
167. This logic makes little sense, however, once the French began opting out of controlling territory
168. Grandval, Ma mission au Maroc
169. Charles-André Julien, "Morocco: The End of an Era," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 2 (January 1956), pp. 199-211.
170. Ernest Gellner, "Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco during the Early Years of Independence," in Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London: D.C. Heath, 1972), p. 369.
171. My thanks to historian Mohammed Zade at Le Haut commissariat aux anciens résistants et anciens membres de l'armée de libération in Rabat for providing these data. Data are drawn from four newspapers from the era: Al-sa ada, Al-Umma, le Petit Marocain, and Maroc-Presse.
172. The two major jumps in June 1954 and May 1955 (indicated by crosses on the time line) occur during Ramadan
173. Monthly data unfortunately stop in December 1955. Despite missing monthly data from January to March 1956, Zade provides an aggregate figure of 4,520 attacks for the whole period.
174. Subtracting the 3,712 attacks through December 1955 leaves 808 events for the first three months of 1956, suggesting that violence continued at high levels, with more than 250 violent events per month
175. David M. Hart, Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 85.
176. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, pp. 54-55.
177. "Return of the Distant Ones," Time, November 28, 1955
178. Blair, Western Window in the Arab World, p. 198.
179. Waterbury, Commander of the Faithful, p. 55.
180. A journalist for the Istiqlal's newspaper was fired for mentioning that participants in the urban terror campaign did not come from party ranks
181. See Ouardighi, L'Itinéraire d'un nationaliste, p. 44.
182. Quoted in Ouardighi, Mémoires d'un ancien résistant, p. 96.
183. Bouzar, L'armée de libération nationale marocain, p. 20.
184. David S. Woolman, Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 226.
185. Abderrahim Ouardighi, interview by author, Rabat, Morocco, May 16, 2006
186. C.R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830: A History (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p. 300.
187. Ouardighi, interview by author
188. Hart, The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif, p. 425.
189. Quoted in Pennell, Morocco since 1830, p. 304.
190. Ouardighi, Mémoires d'un ancien résistant, p. 100.
191. Zade, "Résistance et Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956)," p. 215.
192. For an account of tribal uprisings between 1957 and 1960, see Hart, Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco
193. I. William Zartman, Morocco: Problems of New Power (New York: Atherton, 1964).
194. One possibility is that both arguments are operating: violence is triggered by anger at the French, whereas later violence is explained by competitive dynamics. According to this logic, nationalist movements may tend to fight among themselves once they have succeeded in their aims, fragmenting when they no longer confront a common enemy.
195. If this theory were correct, one might expect to see initial cooperation that degenerates into fragmentation when independence is achieved. That competition in Morocco began immediately after leadership repression and continued unabated supports the view that competitive dynamics were not limited to the final stages of the colonial period.
196. For a more extensive treatment of these cases, see Lawrence, "Imperial Rule and Politics of Nationalism."
197. Algerian leaders were subjected to severe repression during the colonial period
198. For more on competition in Algeria, see Horne, A Savage War of Peace
199. John P. Entelis, Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), p. 49.
200. Tayeb Chentouf, "Pluralisme et unité pendant la guerre d'indépendance (1954-1962): Contrepoints maghrébins," in La guerre d'Algérie au miroir des décolonisations françaises: En l'honneur de Charles-Robert Ageron: Actes du colloque international, Paris, Sorbonne, 23-25 Novembre 2000 (Paris: Société Française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 2000), pp. 283-304.
201. Benjamin Stora, Algeria, 1830-2000: A Short History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001).
202. Jennifer Cole, Forget Colonialism? Sacrifice and the Art of Memory in Madagascar (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), p. 229.
203. Jacques Tronchon, L'insurrection malgache de 1947 (Paris: Librairie François Maspero, 1974), p. 33.
204. Cole, Forget Colonialism? p. 268, notes that although the MDRM was the dominant political force leading up to the rebellion, in the months that followed, rebel generals from a different ethnic group held positions of leadership in the revolt and operated with considerable autonomy.
205. By weakening the MDRM, the French strengthened radical, covert alternatives
206. The violent uprising in Cameroon has received far less scholarly attention than violence in Vietnam and North Africa. The UPC failed to vanquish its rivals for power, and in the postcolonial period, writing about the UPC's struggle was considered an act of opposition under the dictatorship of Cameroon's first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Research on the topic was severely impeded until 1991, when the ban on the UPC was lifted.
207. See Richard A. Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun: Social Origins of the U.P.C. Rebellion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
208. The colonial administration's white paper, written just after leadership repression, stated, "It was necessary at all costs that this party, which had not encountered until now any concerted opposition, did not continue to spread like an oil stain, intensifying its recruitment of adherents, developing the establishment of its local organizations, discrediting by determined propaganda the totality of French work in Cameroun."
209. Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization, p. 180.
210. Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun, p. 348.
211. Franz Ansprenger, The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 149.
212. Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization, p. 20.
213. John Springhall, Decolonization since 1945: The Collapse of European Overseas Empires (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 39.
214. Violent resistance was initially aimed at the Japanese, not the French. The war against the French, which got under way in the postwar period, was essentially a war against reconquest; after the war, the French attempted to retake Vietnam after having been driven from it during the war.
215. For a discussion of internal divisions within the Indochines nationalist movement, see Stein Tønnesson, "National Divisions in Indochina's Decolonization," in Pransenjit Duara, ed., Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 253-277.
216. See Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en marche, p. 584, who documents divisions among the French about leadership repression.
217. For Morocco, politicians in Paris were divided over whether to repress the sultan and the Istiqlal; the colonial administration eventually went forward with it anyway
218. Tony Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization? (Oxford: Berg, 2002), pp. 104-105.
219. Georges Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1965), p. 115.
220. Chafer, The End of Empire in French West Africa, p. 105.
221. The administration claimed that the violence was part of an anti-French rebellion that had to be put down, but this account was questioned in the French National Assembly on the grounds that there was not a single European victim
222. All of the victims were African, and the majority comprised RDA militants
223. Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation, p. 99.
224. Chaffard, Les carnets secrets de la décolonisation, p. 117.
225. Lebanon became independent at the same time as Syria, without using violence
226. Violence in Setif, Algeria, in 1945 was also brutally repressed, and no further violence occurred until the war in 1954
227. See footnote 9
228. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, p. 7.
229. Wimmer and Min, "From Empire to Nation-State."
230. Wendy Pearlman, "Fragmentation and Violence: Internal Influences on Tactics in the Cast of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-2006," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2007.
231. Bloom, Dying to Kill, pp. 51-75.
232. Kristin M. Bakke, "The Turn to Violence in Separatist Struggles in Chechnya and Punjab," in Chenoweth and Lawrence, Rethinking Violence, chap. 9.
233. Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State, p. 207.
234. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee Seymour, "Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: The Effects of Fragmentation on Conflict Processes in Self-Determination Disputes," paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 18, 2010.
235. They show that most self-determination movements are fragmented
236. See also David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 4 (August 2009), pp. 570-597.
237. They code insurgent groups according to their level of centralization
238. See also Paul Staniland, "Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010.