Recruitment and allegiance: The microfoundations of rebellion

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 111-130

  Gates, Scott ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036110870     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002702046001007     Document Type: Article

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