Spoiler problems in peace processes

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 5-51

  Stedman, Stephen John ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0031525315     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2539366     Document Type: Review

References (73)

1. Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 231. For analysis of various risks, see pp. 14-16, 231-232.
2. Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil Wars: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 231. For analysis of various risks, see pp. 14-16, 231-232.
3. Stephen John Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflicts," in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 369-371.
4. Until now, the most widely cited figure for deaths in the Rwandan genocide is 800,000 from Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). In a forthcoming book on the subject, Howard Adelman estimates the figure to be over 1 million.
5. For example, in South Africa prior to 1990 there was no public agreement among the antagonists to peacefully resolve their conflict. Only after the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 and after several public agreements were reached that committed the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African government to a process of negotiation can one speak of a South African peace process. Similarly, in the case of Cambodia, even though negotiations dragged on for several years, the Cambodian peace process began only after the parties formally committed themselves to the Paris Peace Accords.
6. Timothy D. Sisk, in Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace [USIP], 1996), concludes that successful power sharing depends on "a core of moderate, integrated elites [that] has a deeply imbued sense of interdependence and shared or common destiny," p. 117. Most recommendations for power sharing in civil wars simply assume parties are willing to share power.
7. Barbara F. Walter, "The Resolution of Civil Wars: Why Negotiations Fail," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1994, passim.
8. This is a paraphrase of a quotation from Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66.
9. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 20-33.
10. Roy Licklider estimates that 81 percent of civil wars in the twentieth century that were fought over identity issues and ended through the victory of one side did not result in genocide. Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681-690.
11. The appellation of "greedy" comes from Charles L. Glaser, but differs from his definition. Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. Glaser uses "greedy" to refer to parties' motivation for aggressive behavior. In my use of the term, "greedy" does not imply that the spoiler acts out of greed, but rather that it expands its goals and is willing to incur high costs and risks to achieve them.
12. Using my definition, it is a tough call whether the Bosnian Serbs were a spoiler at that point. One could argue that the public peace process had achieved the commitment of the Bosnian and Bosnian Croat parties and therefore the Bosnian Serbs were spoilers.
13. Again, it is difficult to determine whether Aideed was a spoiler by my definition. One could argue that the Addis Ababa agreements between the various clan factions in Somalia constituted a formal peace process and therefore Aideed was a spoiler. Likewise, although Indian diplomats claimed that Prabakaran provided his consent to the peace agreement in 1987, he never signed the agreement.
14. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development," paper presented to the Second Annual Symposium on Information Processing in Organizations, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 15-16, 1982.
15. Another group, the Twa, comprises 1 percent of Rwanda's population. A common figure for the respective populations is 85 percent Hutu and 14 percent Tutsi. Based on new calculations, Howard Adelman estimates that the percentage of Tutsi was greatly underreported, hence the 70 percent/30 percent figure here. Private communication, Howard Adelman, October 10, 1996.
16. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, with Bruce Jones, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996), p. 25.
17. Howard Adelman, "Preventing Post-Cold War Conflicts, What Have We Learned? The Case of Rwanda," paper presented to the International Studies Association Meeting, San Diego, California, April 17, 1996, p. 7.
18. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, pp. 198-203.
19. Adelman, Suhrke, with Jones, The International Response, p. 68.
20. Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, p. 203.
21. Anthony Marley, U.S. Department of State, presentation at the Fourteenth Annual Africa Conference, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., April 7, 1995. Lieutenant Colonel Marley (retired) was the U.S. military attaché to the Arusha process.
22. Adelman, Suhrke, with Jones, The International Response, p. 32.
23. Michael Barnett, "The Politics of Indifference at the United Nations: The Security Council, Peacekeeping, and Genocide in Rwanda," Journal of Cultural Anthropology (forthcoming). At the time, Barnett was a Council on Foreign Relations fellow with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.
24. Barnett, "The Politics of Indifference," p. 35. On flawed judgment, see Alan Kuperman, "The Lessons of Rwanda," SAIS Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 221-240.
25. Barnett, "The Politics of Indifference," p. 35. On flawed judgment, see Alan Kuperman, "The Lessons of Rwanda," SAIS Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 221-240.
26. Stephen Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 99-115.
27. See especially Steven Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 'Self-Demobilizers,'" in Steven Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, eds., Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 73-113.
28. Although the Paris Peace Accords were signed in October 1991, the operational plan for UNTAC was not presented to the Security Council for approval until February 19, 1992. On February 28 the Security Council approved the mission, and on March 15 the secretary-general's special representative to Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi, arrived in Phnom Penh. A small UN holding operation was deployed as a bridge between the signing of the Paris Accords and the arrival of UNTAC.
29. James A. Schear, "Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), p. 253. Schear was an assistant to Akashi in Cambodia.
30. Ibid.
31. Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 51.
32. Under the UN Charter, a Chapter 7 operation permits enforcement against identified threats to peace and does not require the warring parties' consent.
33. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 170-171; Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 67; and Findlay, Cambodia pp. 37-38.
34. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 170-171; Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 67; and Findlay, Cambodia pp. 37-38.
35. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), pp. 170-171; Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 67; and Findlay, Cambodia pp. 37-38.
36. John Sanderson, "UNTAC: Successes and Failures," in H. Smith ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), pp. 16-31.
37. Heder, "The Resumption of Armed Struggle," passim.
38. "Document 43: Letter dated 27 July 1992 from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cambodia to the Secretary-General Concerning the Situation in Cambodia," in The United Nations and Cambodia: 1992-1995, UN Blue Books Series, Vol. 2 (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995), p. 206.
39. Ibid., p. 207.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. "Document 44: 'Cambodia: Next Steps,' Australian Paper Dated 16 September 1992," in The United Nations and Cambodia, p. 208.
43. Ibid.
44. General John Sanderson, as quoted in Jianwei Wang, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia (Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], 1996), p. 71.
45. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, p. 37.
46. Ibid.
47. Gerald Porcell, as quoted in Findlay, Cambodia, p. 63.
48. Ibid., p. 64.
49. Ibid., p. 66.
50. William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal, Contemporary Issues Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), p. 59.
51. Ibid., pp. 59-60.
52. Yasushi Akashi, "UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for U.N. Peace-keeping," the Charles Rostov Annual Lecture on Asian Affairs, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1993, p. 12.
53. Ibid., p. 13.
54. Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal, p. 26.
55. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
56. Yasushi Akashi, "The Challenge of Peace-keeping in Cambodia: Lessons to Be Learned," paper presented to the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, November 29, 1993, p. 8.
57. Michael Doyle, "Peacebuilding in Cambodia," Occasional Paper, International Peace Academy, New York, January 1997.
58. Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman, with Robert Davies, The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 111.
59. Confidential interview.
60. Confidential interview.
61. Margaret Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-1993 (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), p. 205.
62. Confidential interview.
63. Eric Berman, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1996), p. 81.
64. Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1995), pp. 112-114; and Stephen M. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique: Learning the Lessons of Experience," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 133-134.
65. Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1995), pp. 112-114; and Stephen M. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique: Learning the Lessons of Experience," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 1996), pp. 133-134.
66. Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict," pp. 113-114.
67. This is an ongoing theme of Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1995). Hume was the U.S. State Department delegate to the Rome peace talks.
68. Mats Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars," Adelphi Paper No. 303 (London: Institute for International and Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43.
69. Michael Doyle refers to this problem as the "obsolescing bargain of peacekeeping": as long as few resources are committed, UN influence is high; as soon as the United Nations commits substantial resources and personnel, its influence wanes. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia, pp. 82-83.
70. Hill, "Disarmament in Mozambique," p. 137.
71. My impression from interviews with UN and U.S. officials in Maputo at the time is of the unwillingness to consider seriously the possibility that a loser might overturn the election. The refrain that I received from both UN and U.S. officials was "this is not Angola." When pushed to describe the differences that mitigated against a Savimbi-type outcome, the same officials stated that the elections would take place in October only if both armies were fully demobilized, thus rendering moot any obstructionist behavior. In the end, this proved not to be the case.
72. Donald Rothchild's recent work on mediation emphasizes that the granting of legitimacy can be an effective tool in resolving internal conflicts, but that there are often high domestic and international costs for actors to declare previously rogue leaders or factions legitimate. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming 1997), chap. 9.
73. This is the thrust of much of Michael Doyle's latest work on peacekeeping. Michael W. Doyle, "Strategies of Enhanced Consent," in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 483-506.