CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 477-493

  Bereskin, Frederick L ^a   Cicero, David C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

Classified board; Corporate governance; Delaware; Executive compensation; Poison pill

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873160560     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.005     Document Type: Article

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