Sequential Chinese restaurant game

IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing

Volumn 61, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 571-584

  Wang, Chih Yu ^a,b   Chen, Yan ^a   Ray Liu, K J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Chinese restaurant game; Chinese restaurant process; cognitive radio; cooperative sensing; game theory; machine learning; network externality; social learning

Indexed keywords

CHINESE RESTAURANT GAME; CHINESE RESTAURANT PROCESS; COOPERATIVE SENSING; NETWORK EXTERNALITY; SOCIAL LEARNING;

COGNITIVE RADIO; GAME THEORY; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; LEARNING SYSTEMS; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS; RANDOM PROCESSES;

COMPUTER SIMULATION;

EID: 84872336403     PISSN: 1053587X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TSP.2012.2225053     Document Type: Article

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