Chinese Restaurant Game

IEEE Signal Processing Letters

Volumn 19, Issue 12, 2012, Pages 898-901

  Wang, Chih Yu ^a,b   Chen, Yan ^a   Liu, K J Ray ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Chinese restaurant game; game theory; Nash equilibrium; network externality

Indexed keywords

EID: 85008573177     PISSN: 10709908     EISSN: 15582361     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/LSP.2012.2225425     Document Type: Article

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