Coordination and delay in global games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 134, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 195-225

  Dasgupta, Amil ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coordination failure; Global games; Option to delay

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247163086     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.004     Document Type: Article

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