Network architecture, salience and coordination

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 73, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 76-90

  Choi, Syngjoo ^a   Gale, Douglas ^b   Kariv, Shachar ^c   Palfrey, Thomas ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Experiment; Monotone games; Networks; Strategic commitment; Strategic delay

Indexed keywords

EID: 79961029138     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.001     Document Type: Article

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