Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 131-156

  Wit, Jörgen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0006672156     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0634     Document Type: Article

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