Dynamic global games of regime change: Learning, multiplicity, and the timing of attacks

Econometrica

Volumn 75, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 711-756

  Angeletos, George Marios ^a,b   Hellwig, Christian ^c   Pavan, Alessandro ^d  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coordination; Crises; Global games; Information dynamics; Multiple equilibria

Indexed keywords

EID: 34247549702     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00766.x     Document Type: Article

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