Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 53-63

  Feltz, Adam ^a  

^a CMB 6208   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental philosophy; Free will; Individual differences; Intuitions; Manipulation; Moral responsibility

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; EMOTIONAL STABILITY; FEMALE; FREE WILL; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; JURISPRUDENCE; MALE; MORALITY; NORMAL HUMAN; ONLINE SYSTEM; PERSONALITY; PHILOSOPHY; RESPONSIBILITY;

EID: 84871735838     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.007     Document Type: Article

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