Free will, causes, and decisions: Individual differences in written reports

Journal of Consciousness Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 9-10, 2012, Pages 166-189

  Feltz, Adam ^a   Perez, Ashley ^b   Harris, Maegan ^b  

^a CMB 6208   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867671784     PISSN: 13558250     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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