Hold-up: With a vengeance

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 896-908

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a,b   Smith, Alec ^c   Van Essen, Matt ^d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870420043     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00366.x     Document Type: Article

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