Transitions in the negotiations on climate change: From prisoner's dilemma to chicken and beyond

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 23-39

  Pittel, Karen ^a   Rübbelke, Dirk T G ^b,c,d  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b BASQUE CENTRE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE BC3   (Spain)

^c BASQUE FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE   (Spain)

^d CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

2 Person games; Adaptation; Ancillary benefits; Chicken game; Climate change; First mover advantage; International negotiations; Prisoner's dilemma game

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT; CLIMATE CHANGE; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; GAME THEORY; GLOBAL CLIMATE; KYOTO PROTOCOL; MITIGATION; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; PRISONER DILEMMA; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 84857454632     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-010-9126-6     Document Type: Article

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