The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 58, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 266-280

  Carbone, Jared C ^a   Helm, Carsten ^b   Rutherford, Thomas F ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

^b DARMSTADT UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^c ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Coalitions; General equilibrium; Global warming; Tradable permits

Indexed keywords

APRIORI; CARBON EMISSIONS; CLIMATE POLICY; COALITIONS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS; TRADABLE PERMITS; TRADE AGREEMENTS; TRADING SYSTEMS; WORLD ECONOMY;

INTERNATIONAL TRADE;

GLOBAL WARMING;

CALIBRATION; CARBON EMISSION; DECISION MAKING; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GLOBAL WARMING; INCENTIVE; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; TRADE AGREEMENT;

EID: 68349101590     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2009.01.001     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Barrett S. Self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Oxford Economic Papers 46 (1994) 878-894
2. Barrett S. Heterogeneous international environmental agreements. In: Carraro C. (Ed). International Environmental Negotiations (1997), Elgar, Cheltenham, UK
3. Barrett S. Environment and Statecraft (2003), Oxford University Press, Oxford
4. P.M. Bernstein, W.D. Montgomery, T.F. Rutherford, G.-F. Yang, Effects of restrictions on international permit trading: the MS-MRT model, The Energy Journal (1999) 221-256 (Kyoto special issue).
5. Botteon M., and Carraro C. Burden sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries. In: Carraro C. (Ed). International Environmental Negotiations (1997), Elgar, Cheltenham, UK
6. Böhringer C., and Löschel A. Market power and hot air in international emissions trading: the impacts of US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. Applied Economics 35 6 (2003) 651-663
7. Böhringer C., and Löschel A. Climate policy beyond Kyoto: Quo Vadis? a computable general equilibrium analysis based on expert judgments. Kyklos 58 4 (2005) 467-493
8. Carraro C., and Siniscalco D. Strategies for the international protection of the environment. Journal of Public Economics 52 (1993) 309-328
9. Copeland B.R., and Taylor M.S. Trade and transboundary pollution. American Economics Review 85 (1995) 716-737
10. Copeland B.R., and Taylor M.S. Trade, growth and the environment. Journal of Economic Literature 42 (2004) 7-71
11. B.V. Dimaranan, R.A. McDougall, Global trade, assistance, and production: the GTAP 5 data base, Technical Report, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University, 2002.
12. Eyckmans J., and Tulkens H. Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem. Resource and Energy Economics 25 4 (2003) 299-327
13. 2 reductions and carbon leakage: the effect of international trade in oil and basic materials. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25 (1993) 162-176
14. Finus M. Stability and design of international environmental agreements: the case of transboundary pollution. In: Folmer H., and Tietenberg T. (Eds). International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 2003/4 (2003), Edward Elgar 82-158 (Chapter 3)
15. Finus M., and Maus S. Modesty may pay!. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 5 (2008) 801-826
16. A. Gurgel, G. Metcalf, N. Osouf, J. Reilly, Computing tax rates for economic modeling: a global dataset approach, Technical Note 11, MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, 2007.
17. Hahn R.W. Market power and transferable property rights. Quarterly Journal of Economics 99 (1984) 753-765
18. Helm C. International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices. Journal of Public Economics 87 12 (2003) 2737-2747
19. Hertel T., Hummels D., Ivanic M., and Keeney R. How confident can we be in CGE-based assessments of free trade agreements?. Economic Modelling 24 4 (2007) 611-635
20. D. Hummels, Toward a geography of trade costs, GTAP Working Paper No. 17, Purdue University, 1999.
21. Kehoe T.J. An evaluation of the performance of applied general equilibrium models on the impact of NAFTA. In: Kehoe T.J., Srinivasan T.N., and Whalley J. (Eds). Frontiers of Applied General Equilibrium Modeling: in Honor of Herbert Scarf (2005), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 341-377
22. Mathiesen L. Computation of economic equilibrium by a sequence of linear complementarity problems. Mathematical Programming Study 23 (1985) 144-162
23. Missfeldt F. Game-theoretic modelling of transboundary pollution. Journal of Economic Surveys 13 3 (1999) 287-321
24. Murdoch J.C., Sandler T., and Vijverberg W.P. The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis. Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 337-362
25. Mäler K.-G. The acid rain game. In: Folmer H., and v. Ierland E. (Eds). Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics (1989), Elsevier, Amsterdam 231-252
26. Nordhaus W.D. To slow or not to slow: the economics of greenhouse effect. The Economic Journal 101 407 (1991)
27. Nordhaus W.D., and Yang Z. A regional dynamic general-equilibrium model of alternative climate-change strategies. American Economic Review 86 (1996) 741-765
28. M. Rolleigh, Plant heterogeneity and applied general equilibrium models of trade: lessons from the CA-US FTA, 2004 Meeting Papers 360, Society for Economic Dynamics, 2004.
29. Tol R. Estimates of the damage cost of climate change. Environmental and Resource Economics 21 2 (2002) 135-160
30. Tol R.S. Climate coalitions in an integrated assessment model. Computational Economics 18 (2001) 159-172
31. US Department of Energy, Office of Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, International Energy Outlook 2002, 2002. DOE/EIA-0484, 2002.