Potential failure of an international environmental agreement under asymmetric information

Economics Bulletin

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Matsueda, Norimichi ^a  

^a KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867726379     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15452921     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Baumol, W. and W. Oates (1988) The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
2. Cesar, H. and A. de Zeeuw (1995) "Issue Linkage in Global Environmental Problems" In Environmental Policy for the Environmental and Natural Resources: Techniques for the Management and Control of Pollution by A. Xepapadeas, Ed., E. Elgar: Cheltenham
3. Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991) Game Theory, MIT Press: Cambridge
4. Harsanyi, J. (1967) "Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players" Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334, 486-502
5. Huber, C. and F. Wirl (1996) "Optimal Incentives to Reduce Transboundary Emissions: Theory and Empirical Illustration to Sulphur Emissions in Austria and (former) Czechoslovakia" Empirica 23, 149-172
6. Kerschbamer, R. and N. Maderner (2001) "Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information" Environmental and Resource Economics 19, 343-360
7. Mäler, K. (1990) "International Environmental Problem" Oxford Review of Economic Policy 6, 80-108
8. Muthoo, A. (1999) Bargaining and Its Applications, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge