Enforcing the climate regime: Game theory and the marrakesh accords

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 1-26

  Hovi, Jon ^a,b   Areklett, Ivar ^a  

^a CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Climate change; Compliance; Enforcement; Non cooperative games

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; COMPLIANCE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GAME THEORY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 8744248608     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:INEA.0000019026.02330.da     Document Type: Review

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