The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 89, Issue 2-3, 2005, Pages 159-196

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a,b   Martimort, David ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

Author keywords

Incentive mechanisms; Transnational public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 11844269294     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.005     Document Type: Article

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