Ideals, conformism and reciprocity: A model of individual choice with conformist motivations, and an application to the not-for-profit case

Handbook on the Economics of Happiness

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 532-569

  Sacconi, Lorenzo ^a   Grimalda, Gianluca ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84881686780     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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