Delegating supremacy?

Vanderbilt Law Review

Volumn 65, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1125-1191

  Rubenstein, David S ^a  

^a WASHBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84862611420     PISSN: 00422533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (248)

1. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011);
2. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);
3. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988);
4. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
5. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-78.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1334-36 (2001).
8. [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers];
9. Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681 (2008)
10. [hereinafter Clark, Procedural Safeguards];
11. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 895 (2008) (same).
12. But cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1563-73 (2008).
13. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 13, 20 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009);
14. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249).
15. - 2008 WL 3851613, at 25.
16. see also Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 963 (1985).
17. For discussion and commentary on traditionally asserted values of federalism, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499 (1995).
18. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997). (Pubitemid 127423564)
19. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 756 (2008);
20. see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 225-26 (2009).
21. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011);
22. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011);
23. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011);
24. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009);
25. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
26. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 nn.26-28 (2011);
27. see also Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 695 (2008).
28. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2154 (2008);
29. William Funk, Preemption by Federal Agency Action, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 5, at 215; Mendelson, supra note 10, at 698; Merrill, supra note 8, at 760; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 335 (2000).
30. But cf. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1940 (2008);
31. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2071-72 (2008).
32. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1524-25 (2009);
33. Karen A. Jordan, Opening the Door to "Hard-Look" Review of Agency Preemption, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353, 353 (2009);
34. Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004);
35. Catherine Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: Agency Forcing Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2185-86 (2009).
36. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1422-23 (2008).
37. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (discussing values of regulatory disuniformity);
38. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1578 (2007) (same).
39. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
40. see also Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 826 (1995).
41. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
42. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992);
43. see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (9th ed. 2009).
44. See Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE L.J. 979, 980 (1993).
45. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 983 (1997).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
47. - 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941);
48. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992);
49. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976);
50. see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
51. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
52. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
53. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985).
54. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2006);
55. see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1950).
56. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Monophonic Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 811, 812 (2008).
57. U.S. CONST. art. I.
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895);
59. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918);
60. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
61. H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially- Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 893 (1999).
62. See United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000);
63. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
64. But, as others have observed, the Court's subsequent decision in Gonzales v. Raich deflated much of that promise.
65. - 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005);
66. see also Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1403 (2010);
67. Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 118
68. explaining that the "apparent limitations on federal authority established by Lopez and Morrison were virtually eviscerated in Gonzalez v. Raich".
69. But cf. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 750 (2005);
70. George D. Brown, Counterrevolution? National Criminal Law After Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 974-82 (2005).
71. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 345.
72. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954).
73. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-56 (1985);
74. see also Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 514 (1987).
75. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47.
76. overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976);
77. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
78. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 106-33 (2001);
79. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 218 (2000);
80. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1985);
81. John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1318 (1997).
82. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
83. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2088 (2000);
84. see also Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 (2000).
85. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770-73 (1994).
86. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992);
87. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983);
88. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
89. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-28, at 1177 (3d ed. 2000);
90. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
91. Although express preemption decisions are tethered to a search for congressional intent, see for example, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011).
92. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
93. See, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 98.
94. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
95. See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
96. Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 70-71 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
98. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1627 (2008).
99. Ernest Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8-13, 132 (2004).
100. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687-88 (1991);
101. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947);
102. see also, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 564-65 (2009);
103. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (same);
104. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
105. see also Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000).
106. see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2 (2008).
107. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1385 (2001).
108. Scott Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy From Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 57 (2008).
109. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991).
110. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007).
111. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848-50 (2005).
112. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-41 (1994).
113. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
114. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1985);
115. see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 45 (1982).
116. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting);
117. accord David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policymaking: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 425 (1997).
118. Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 47 (1982);
119. David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2179-80 (2010).
120. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444-48 (2008).
121. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987).
122. See generally RANDALL RIPLEY & GRACE FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1984).
123. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000).
124. see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (1989).
125. Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 107-08 (2010).
126. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
127. On whether delegations are normatively desirable, compare, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91-98 (1985).
128. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43, 62-63 (1982).
129. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335 (2002);
130. see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 478-79 (1989);
132. see also SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 24 (1975).
133. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004).
134. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 490 (1985).
135. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 130-32 (1980);
136. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 141-43 (1995)
137. Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 820 (1999)
138. But cf. PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 4-21 (1981);
139. Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 230, 238-68 (1988) (same).
140. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 238-40;
141. see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 769-80 (2002).
142. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928);
143. see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001);
144. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-75, 379 (1989) (same).
145. The infamous New Deal cases striking down Congress's delegations are A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534-42 (1935).
146. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935).
147. For paradigmatic examples of the Court's tolerance for broad delegations, see, for example, American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946);
148. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944);
149. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
150. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 517 (2003).
151. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 630 (1992);
152. - 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996);
153. accord Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
154. - 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001)
155. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
156. see also Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 716-17 (2008);
157. John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2008).
158. see also Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36 (1994).
159. see also Gregory M. Dickenson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667 (2011).
160. Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1984).
161. For additional examples of express grants of preemptive authority, see 47 U.S.C. § 253(d) (2006)
162. - 49 U.S.C. § 5125(d) (2006).
163. Preemption Determination No. 21(r), 64 Fed. Reg. 54,474 (Dep't of Transp. Oct. 6, 1999);
164. see also Tennessee v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 326 F.3d 729, 730 (6th Cir. 2003).
165. - 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
166. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 544(e) (Supp. IV 1982)).
167. see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982).
168. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154.
169. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 64.
170. (quoting de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154).
171. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
172. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 867-68;
173. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1993);
174. City of New York, 486 U.S. at 66-67;
175. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 170;
176. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-85 (1961);
177. see also Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
178. Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
179. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 59 (1988).
180. - 555 U.S. 555, 580-81 (2009).
181. Cf. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576-77.
182. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996).
183. - 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988) (citations omitted).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
185. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 183 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937).
186. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 167-68 (2011).
187. Catherine Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 40-41 (1996);
188. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 528-33 (1992);
189. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 716-27 (1992).
190. Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson from Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2000).
191. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991
192. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-92 (1995);
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
194. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
195. THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 21 (2008) ("The preemption war is a manifestation of the latest and, in many ways, most threatening attempt to change state common law by replacing it with a body of regulatory law that is kinder and gentler to the regulated entities.").
196. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
197. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989).
198. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
199. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
200. Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation of Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 888 (2005) (arguing that four
201. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992
202. Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 339, 342 (2010)
203. Mark Seidenfeld, Who Decides Who Decides: Federal Regulatory Preemption of State Tort Law, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 611, 626 n.64 (2010)
204. Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-Powers Defense of the "Presumption Against Preemption," 84 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1193 (2010)
205. Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, 81, 81-97 (discussing the role of state attorneys general in picking up the slack of federal underenforcement).
206. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668-70 (2001).
207. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998);
208. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997).
209. William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism's Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE
210. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1385-89 (2006) (discussing the ability of differing state tort law regimes to benefit in-state residents at the expense of out-of-state residents); see also Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 101 (2002) (exploring the risk of "interstate exploitation").
211. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies re: Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693-94 (May 20, 2009).
212. CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, FEDERAL AGENCY PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW (2010), available at http://www.Acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/12/Sharkey- Draft-ACUS-Report-2010-11-27.pdf.
213. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544 (1994)
214. see also JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION § 7.3 (2006).
215. For examples of savings clauses, see Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act § 24, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006);
216. McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006);
217. Toxic Substances Control Act § 18(a)(1).
218. - 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (2006);
219. Clean Water Act § 510
220. - 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006);
221. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006).
222. For a seminal treatment of this movement in public law more generally, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
223. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause).
224. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2334 (2001).
225. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2075
226. (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 121 note) (West 2012);
227. see also DANA A. SHEA & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33847, CHEMICAL FACILITY SECURITY: REGULATION AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8-9 (2008).
228. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1992).
229. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1002, 1323, 124 Stat. 119, 138-39, 192-99 (2010).
230. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576-77 (2009).
231. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21 n.23 (2010);
232. Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court's Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 429-30 (2011);
233. see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997).
234. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 276 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1996).
235. Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1816 (2007);
236. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576-99 (2009).
237. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1531 (1987) (same).
238. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (2008) (exploring the practice of congressional delegation to the judiciary).
239. See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011);
240. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011);
241. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011);
242. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 554, 576-78 (2009).
243. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011);
244. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009);
245. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 545, 576-77 (2009).
246. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009);
247. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
248. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160-61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).