Monophonic preemption

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 102, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 811-839

  Schapiro, Robert A ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

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EID: 49749144136     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (127)

1. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7 (2001).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
3. The Court refused to extend Lopez and Morrison in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and refused to extend its sovereign immunity jurisprudence in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), and United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006). However, the Court may be only one vote shy of a major new limitation on the authority of the federal government to promulgate environmental regulations. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
4. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39 (2005); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).
5. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994) (characterizing preemption as "almost certainly the most frequently used doctrine of constitutional law in practice"); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 217 (asserting that, with regard to the antidiscrimination component of the dormant commerce clause, "few constitutional principles give the Court as regular ... business").
6. See Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551,1591-93 (2003) (book review).
7. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA. L. REV. 243 (2005).
8. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
9. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding a California statute requiring disclosure of information about Holocaust-era insurance policies preempted by United States foreign policy); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (holding a state statute regulating advertising of tobacco products preempted by federal law); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding a state law restricting state transactions with companies doing business with Burma preempted by United States foreign policy); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding state regulation of oil spills preempted by a federal statute); Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding a state law regulating workers at hazardous waste sites preempted by federal law).
10. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
11. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
12. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13. Bush v. Gore was not even the only decision involving a Gore to witness new federal oversight of state courts. In BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), the Court also took a victory away from a Gore because of the putative inadequacy of state court procedures.
14. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 30.
15. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
16. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69, 70 (2005) (describing "hypocrisies" in the Rehnquist Court's treatment of federal-ism in preemption cases); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1324 (2004) (finding preemption cases inconsistent with the Court's other federalism cases); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 343 (2003); James B. Staab, Conservative Activism on the Rehnquist Court: Federal Preemption Is No Longer a Liberal Issue, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 129, 183 (2003).
17. See Schapiro, supra note 7.
18. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
19. See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
20. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
21. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 508-09 (1997).
22. See id. at 535-40.
23. See, e.g.. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 439 n.52 (1946) ("It would be a shocking thing, if state and federal governments acting together were prevented from achieving the end desired by both, simply because of the division of power between them." (quoting FREDERICK D.G. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 211 (1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act).
24. See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (distinguishing between manufacture and commerce).
25. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (distinguishing between direct and indirect effects on commerce).
26. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1138-44 (2000).
28. See Gardbaum, supra note 21, at 535-40.
29. See, e.g.. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (holding state law to be preempted while affirming the presumption against preemption).
30. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (applying the dormant commerce clause to strike down a state law that imposed an excessive burden on commerce).
31. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
33. See id. at 617-18 ("The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
34. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
35. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
36. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
37. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1997).
38. See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 288-90.
39. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
41. See Jules Coleman, The Costs of The Costs of Accidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 337, 341 (2005) (discussing the development of the view that "tort law is an available technology of cost avoidance: a poten-tial tool of social policy"); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 582-83 (2005) (describing develop-ment of the conception of tort law as public, regulatory law).
42. See Goldberg, supra note 41, at 596-611 (arguing that tort law should be conceived as the law for the redress of private wrongs).
43. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992) (arguing that rather than viewing tort law as designed to rectify market failure by moving resources from one party to another in the form of forced transfers, tort law rectifies wrongful losses by imposing their costs on those individuals who have the duty in justice to repair them).
44. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
45. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159(2006).
46. See id. at 168-69.
47. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1583 (2007) (noting the role of tort litigation, including discovery, in eliciting information that can inform regulatory activity); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-70 (2004) (noting role of tort law in forcing companies to disclose important health-related information).
48. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 656-57 (1981) (discussing the values of redundancy); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 40, at 1042-46 (discussing federalism as providing a redundant system for protecting rights); Martin Landau, Federalism, Redundancy and System Reliability, PUBLIUS, Autumn 1973, at 173, 188-89 (emphasizing the role of federalism in providing redundancy).
49. See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 1589.
50. See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 902-29 (2000) (discussing " federalization" of criminal law).
51. The policy takes its name from Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960). For a discussion of the history of the doctrine, see Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167,177-81 (2004).
52. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2003).
53. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-27 (1995) (arguing that in light of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, it is anomalous to allow states and the federal government together to prosecute a defendant twice, when neither acting alone could prosecute the defendant twice).
54. See Podgor, supra note 51, at 177-81.
55. In 1991, a video tape captured four white Los Angeles Police Department Officers beating Rodney King, who was African American. The police officers were tried and acquitted in state court of using excessive force. Widespread rioting followed the verdicts. In a subsequent federal prosecution, two of the officers were convicted of violating King's civil rights. For a description of the events, see Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 510-33 (1994).
56. See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 290-92.
57. See New York v. Unites States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) ("[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished.").
58. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political accountability . . . ."); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur . . . ." (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. Dean Edward Rubin has offered a powerful critique of this accountability argument. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2083-91 (2005) (discussing the "implausibility" of underlying assumptions that citizens could properly identify the responsible level of government in the absence of "commandeering," that "commandeering" confuses the citizens, and that state and local officials cannot dispel any confusion that does result).
60. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1386-89(2006).
61. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (discussing the incentive of states to lower environmental Standards to attract businesses); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (questioning the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal standard-setting).
62. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130 (2004) (quoting Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword-Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983)).
63. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 60, at 1368.
64. See, e.g., Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997) ("If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints." (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. 95 U.S. 714(1877).
66. Id. at 722.
67. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
68. For a broad discussion of the significance of the declining importance of borders, see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
69. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
70. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) ("Ideally, federal law ought to preempt state law when state governments are untrustworthy because of their partiality, disruptive effects on national markets, and incentives for cost exporting."); Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 60, at 1368 (proposing an account of preemption that focuses on "interests in promoting national uniformity and protecting against spillover effects"); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 174-76 (Richard Epstein & Michael Greve eds., 2007) (noting preemption as a potential remedy for states' ex-porting a disproportionate share of the costs of their environmental regulations onto other states); Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 20-22 (2000) (discussing the problem of state regulation that externalizes costs and disrupts national markets in uniform products).
71. The federal legislative process, of course, may be subject to other dangers of predation. See Hills, supra note 70, at 10-16 (describing the institutional failings resulting from the large scale of fed-eral government).
72. See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 1608 n.216.
73. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341 (2002) [hereinafter Helland & Tabarrok, Effect of Electoral Institutions]; Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Heiland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 JX. & ECON. 157 (1999) [hereinafter Tabarrok & Heiland, Court Politics].
74. See Helland & Tabarrok, Effect of Electoral Institutions, supra note 73, at 359 ("The coefficients on nonpartisan out and on nonpartisan in are almost identical, which suggests that there is little or no penalty against out-of-state businesses in nonpartisan states."). The findings of the earlier Heiland and Tabarrok study, by contrast, do suggest that even in states without partisan elections, out-of-state businesses fare worse. However, the authors note the potential for confounding factors, such as the possibility that out-of-state firms are systematically larger and involved in more serious cases than in-state firms. See Tabarrok & Heiland, Court Politics, supra note 73, at 163, 169 ("Our preliminary results indicate . . . [that i]n both elected and appointed states, awards against out-of-state firms are much larger than against in-state firms.").
75. See Helland & Tabarrok, Effect of Electoral Institutions, supra note 73, at 367 ("[A]wards in cases with out-of-state defendants are larger in partisan elected states when state judges are deciding cases, but not when nonelected federal judges with life tenure are deciding cases."); see also Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 936 (1996) ("The presence of these federal judge liability-expanding landmarks makes it difficult to believe that state court judges, in expanding liability, have been influenced in any major way by mere in-state preferences.").
76. See Kavan Peterson, Cost of Judicial Races Stirs Reformers, STATELINE.ORG, Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage. action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=47067 (reporting that in judicial elections, "[b]usiness groups, [led] by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, doubled contributions from $8.4 million in 2002 to $15.8 million nationwide in 2004, exceeding for the first time total contributions by trial lawyers").
77. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.3.4 (3d ed. 2006).
78. See Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2165-68 (2006).
79. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comrn'n, 458 U.S. 307,315 (1982).
80. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 16-17.
81. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION: REGULATORY FEDERALISM 159-75 (2005) (discussing various forms of partial federal preemption).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
83. See Buzbee, supra note 47, at 1561 n.36 (giving examples of nuclear power and vaccine regula-tions, which have preemptive force, but provide alternative compensatory schemes).
84. See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 60, at 1374-76 (arguing that preemption protects the constitutional principle of a uniform national policy with regard to international commerce).
85. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding the California statute requiring the disclosure of information about Holocaust-era insurance policies preempted by the foreign policy of the United States); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding a state law restricting state transactions with companies doing business with Burma preempted by the foreign policy of the United States); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding the state regulation of oil spills preempted by federal statute).
86. For a discussion of the development of the Westphalian order, see Berman, supra note 68, at 453-59.
87. See Gar Alperovitz, California Split, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2007, at A15.
88. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 192-93 (2005).
89. See Felicity Barringer, California, Taking Big Gamble, Tries to Curb Greenhouse Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2006, at Al.
90. See Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does this Say about Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1018 (2006).
91. See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 65-68 (2005).
92. Id. at 65.
93. See Engel, supra note 90, at 1028.
94. See Engel, supra note 91, at 65-68.
95. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1563 (2007); Engel, supra note 90; Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Engel, supra note 91; Engel & Saleska, supra note 88.
96. See Judith Resnik, Law 's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism 's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); see also Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001).
97. Resnik, supra note 96, at 1640.
98. See id. at 1641-42.
99. Id. at 1642-43 (quoting L.A., Cal., Ordinance 175,735 (Dec. 24,2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Of course, the initial rise of the nation-state served to displace political systems in which power tended to be more decentralized. The existence of significant and interactive subnational and supranational bodies has a long history. The Holy Roman Empire provides a notable example. See Berman, supra note 68, at 453-56.
101. See generally Hills, supra note 70.
102. Id. at 16-32.
103. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824(1998).
104. See Mendellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (discussing the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law and those that do not); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 (1987).
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
106. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 103.
107. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 366-67 (2002) (describing the modern view of CIL as well as the revisionist position before advocating an intermediate solution).
108. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 103, at 870.
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989 (2004) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91 (2004) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism].
111. See Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism, supra note 110, at 97-99.
112. Young, supra note 107, at 460.
113. See id. at 496-508.
114. See Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box, supra note 110; Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism, supra note 110.
115. Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism, supra note 110, at 106.
116. Id.
117. Determining legislative intent is always difficult. For an overview of some of the problems, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 213-22 (2000). Canons of interpretation can be especially useful when intent is unclear. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons ' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 285 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 717-18 n.365 (2001) (discussing the usefulness of canons in light of the difficulty in ascertaining legislative intent).
118. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.").
119. E.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432-33 (2002); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
120. Scholars find mixed evidence of the importance of the Rice presumption. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 60, at 1383 n.109 ("The Court has seemed to adhere to a 'presumption against preemption,' especially prevalent in situations in which the federal government regulates in areas traditionally within the domain of the states.... The current viability of the presumption is, however, subject to debate.").
121. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 591 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Geierv. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,907 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 526 n.203 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's "promiscuous use" of preemption).
123. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 228-29; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, § 5.2, at 412-16 (discussing preemption of state laws that impede federal objectives).
124. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, § 5.2, at 412-16.
125. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); see also Meltzer, supra note 16, at 366 (discussing Buckman).
126. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
127. Dean Larry Kramer, among others, has noted the assertive nature of the Rehnquist Court. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 131-58 (2001).