The evolution of boards and CEOs following performance declines

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 727-744

  Easterwood, John C ^a   Ince, Özgür Ş ^a   Raheja, Charu G ^b,c  

^a PAMPLIN COLLEGE OF BUSINESS   (United States)

^b WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TriageLogic Management   (United States)

Author keywords

Board structure; CEO influence; Corporate governance; Director turnover; Financial distress; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862311134     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.05.006     Document Type: Article

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