The normativity of copying in copyright law

Duke Law Journal

Volumn 62, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 203-284

  Balganesh, Shyamkrishna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84861403484     PISSN: 00127086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (254)

1. For an extensive discussion of the propertarian turn in copyright law, identifying its causes and effects, see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 154-68 (2008)
2. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1132-42 (2009).
3. For an early instantiation of this idea in the first copyright statute, see An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.), which granted authors the sole right and liberty of "printing" written work. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, (amended).
4. Nimmer on Copyright, MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2012).
5. See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344 (1989) (recognizing the fact that "copyright merely gives protection against copying" as a principal feature of copyright law).
6. For the leading account in this area, see generally Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 480-82 (2006).
8. Michael K. Erickson, Comment, Emphasizing the Copy in Copyright: Why Noncopying Alterations Do Not Prepare Infringing Derivative Works, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1261, 1297.
9. The literature trying to understand the copyright-patent divergence in terms of information costs also focuses primarily on the probative dimension of copyright's copying requirement and its independent-creation defense
10. See Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 526 (2004).
11. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810 (2007).
12. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
13. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 1:1 (2010).
14. See Ringgold v. BET, 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing two different steps: "proof of copying" and "determining that the degree of similarity suffices to demonstrate actionable infringement").
15. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement (pt. 1), 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 719, 721-23 (2010).
16. E.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. It is worth noting that courts do not generally use the term "thickness" themselves. They nonetheless do routinely describe an entitlement as "thin." E.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts also occasionally refer to entitlements as "thick." See Fleener v. Trinity Broad. Network, 203 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("[Books] are accorded 'thick' copyright protection.").
18. For early identifiable scholarly uses of "thickness" as a variable in light of these usages by courts, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 859 n.42, 884-87 (2004).
19. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008).
20. Eric Setliff, Copyright and Industrial Design: An "Alternative Design" Alternative, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 77 (2006).
21. For a further explanation of thickness, see infra Part I.B.
22. See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 ("If copying is established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation).").
23. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 875 (2006).
24. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25. See HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 538 (1978)
26. Rudolf Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit D'Auteur," 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 178 (1959) ("For the French the droit d'auteur is the most personal of all properties because it is the creation of the mind, and this droit d'auteur has its origin and justification in the very fact of the intellectual creation.").
27. See infra Part II
28. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 992 (1990).
29. See JEAN-ANTOINE-NICOLAS CARITAT DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ANALYSE À LA PROBABILIT́E DES D́ECISIONS RENDUES À LA PLURALIT́E DES VOIX (1785)
30. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 93 (1963).
31. LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 5-7 (2011)
32. See KENNETH ARROW & HERVÉ RAYNAUD, SOCIAL CHOICE AND MULTICRITERION DECISION-MAKING 18-23 (1986)
33. For a demonstration of the idea, see Reinold H. Van Til, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 126 DE ECONOMIST 84, 93-96 (1978). In social-choice theory, this is referred to as the axiom of the "independence of irrelevant alternatives."
34. See Paramesh Ray, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, 41 ECONOMETRICA 987 (1973)
35. Cf. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (holding that a factual compilation, with little original expression, would receive the thinnest copyright protection).
36. See generally Bruno Mottin, Reading the Image, in JEAN-PIERRE MOHEN ET AL., MONA LISA: INSIDE THE PAINTING 64, 70 (2006) (cataloguing minute details of the model that "vibrate in the light and quiver at the slightest breath of wind").
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. For prominent examples, see Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1998).
39. Which analogizes conceptual sequencing in the law to a committee ordering certain values when selecting students for academic scholarships, and Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621, 625 (2002), which argues that the separate values of deterrence and corrective justice in tort law can be reconciled through conceptual sequencing.
40. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 738-40 (2012) (arguing for its abolition).
41. For an elaboration of this argument in the context of state intellectual-property regimes, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1550 (2010).
42. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005).
44. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 126, 475-76 (4th rev. ed. 2007).
45. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
46. For criticisms of substantial similarity's open-endedness, see generally Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987).
47. Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181 (1993).
48. Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
50. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
51. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
52. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 ("The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.").
53. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
54. See, e.g., Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1986).
55. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
56. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) superseded on other grounds by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, ch. 5, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541, 2585 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
57. See Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1988) ("If, as Arnstein suggested, copyright law should protect the plaintiff's interest in potential financial returns, the ultimate test for infringement should consider specifically the response of the market from which those returns would derive.").
58. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733-34 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In light of the copyright law's purpose of protecting a creator's market, we think it sensible to embrace Arnstein's command that the ultimate comparison of the works at issue be oriented toward the works' intended audience.").
59. For more on this, see infra Part II.B.2.
60. Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)).
61. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1999).
62. Peel & Co. v. Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 398 (5th Cir. 2001).
63. See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 2009).
64. [17] U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
65. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1506 (2009) ("Copyright law fails to. .. calibrate the scope of the copyright protection to the degree of the work's originality.").
66. See Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]here the plaintiff's work contains no material imported from the public domain, the 'more discerning' test is unnecessary." (quoting Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1999))).
67. R. Ready Prods., Inc. v. Cantrell, 85 F. Supp. 2d 672, 683 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101-02, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hamil, 193 F.3d at 101 ("This [more discerning ordinary-observer] test is applied when a work contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, and requires the court to eliminate the unprotectible elements from its consideration and to ask whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially similar." (quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991))); Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 766 ("[S]ince only some of the design enjoys copyright protection, the observer's attention must be more discerning.").
68. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here we compare products that contain both protectible and unprotectible elements, our inspection must be 'more discerning'; we must attempt to extract the unprotectible elements from our consideration. .. .").
69. See Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[W]here a design contains both protectible and unprotectible elements, we have held that the observer's inspection must be more 'discerning,' ignoring those aspects of a work that are unprotectible in making the comparison." (quoting Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 765-66)).
70. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003 ("Having narrowed the scope of the copyright, we applied the 'more discerning' ordinary-observer test and compared only the protected portion of the design. .. .").
71. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 1982) ("As a work embodies more in the way of particularized expression, it. .. receives broader copyright protection.. .. [T]he 'strongest' works. .. are almost entirely products of the author's creativity. .. ."), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985); Pampered Chef Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("[D]ifferent types of materials may be subject to varying degrees of copyright protection. Materials that are primarily fanciful, complex, artistic, novel and original are generally the most strongly protected by copyrights. .. .").
72. Atari, 672 F.2d at 617.
73. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2010); MyWebGrocer LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 194 (2d Cir. 2004); Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2003); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003) ("When we apply the limiting doctrines, subtracting the unoriginal elements, Ets-Hokin is left with only a 'thin' copyright, which protects against only virtually identical copying.").
74. See TransWestern Publ'g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773, 776 (10th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Brennan, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1258 (D.N.M. 2009).
75. Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994).
76. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
77. Boisson v. Banian Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995)).
78. For an excellent example of how courts work this analysis, see Boisson, 273 F.2d at 273-76.
79. Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1443.
80. [17] U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
81. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 3449 (1991).
82. See, e.g., Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
83. See, e.g., Trek Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 66 Feed. Cl. 8,14 (2005).
84. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).
85. E.g., Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985).
86. E.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
87. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Substantiality is measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff's work as a whole."); Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1376-77 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering the "[a]mount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole").
88. See Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 (finding that the infringer "use[d] about two-thirds of the protectible material").
89. Nihon, 166 F.3d at 71 ("It is not possible to determine infringement through a simple word count; the quantitative analysis of two works must always occur in the shadow of their qualitative nature.").
90. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (observing that the test has become "virtually devoid of analysis" because it "has become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not similar").
91. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 273 (2d Cir. 2001).
92. See Tufenkian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the test cannot be applied through the eyes of "the judicial observer who has a passing familiarity with [the market]").
93. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Video games, unlike an artist's painting or even other audiovisual works, appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their concern about more subtle differences in artistic expression."), superseded on other grounds by FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1985).
95. Odegard Inc. v. Safavieh Carpets, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 2d 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
96. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324 (2012).
97. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010) (discussing the factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised "reasonable" care under the circumstances in question)
98. See, e.g., Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. 1979) ("Indeed, our courts have long recognized that one who engages in a business, occupation, or profession must exercise the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary care.").
99. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1747 (1976).
100. Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 317-18 (1914) ("The 'ordinary prudent man' is a palpable fiction. ... What this imaginary person would have done really means what the jury thinks was the proper thing to do. .. .").
101. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
102. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 52 (2010) (focusing on copyright reform through statutory changes).
103. See supra Part I.B.
104. See supra Part I.C.
105. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 945-47 (2010).
106. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response, Tiered Originality and the Dualism of Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 69 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2009/11/30/balganesh.
107. Bruce Chapman, More Easily Done Than Said: Rules, Reasons, and Rational Social Choice, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 296-97 (1998).
108. This is an important axiom. In the event that the criteria themselves can be weighted differently-which would be the equivalent of treating different voters differently in the election-the problem dissipates in large measure.
109. See Leo Katz, A Theory of Loopholes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2010) ("[L]oophole exploitation and skillful persuasion turn out to differ only by a hair, and inasmuch as we never felt too uneasy about the latter, we have one more reason not to feel too uneasy about the former.").
110. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540-43 (1972).
111. But see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52-62 (2002)
112. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1577 (2009).
113. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003).
114. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 613 (1962).
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) ("Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science. .. ."); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) ("The 'constitutional command,' we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a 'system' that 'promote[s] the Progress of Science.'" (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1965)) (alteration in original)); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.").
116. The precise ranking of thick and thin protection becomes irrelevant in the binary choice between the plaintiff and the defendant, because either way "protection" involves finding for the plaintiff-creator, which the court chooses not to
117. See supra Part I.C.
118. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328, 342 (1950).
119. The formal proof was titled the "General Possibility Theorem." In due course, it came to acquire the name it currently holds. Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 1764, 1765 (1984).
120. Bruce Chapman, Law Games: Defeasible Rules and Revisable Rationality, 17 LAW & PHIL. 443, 453 n.23 (1998).
121. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Towards a Reasonable Accommodation, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276, 308-12 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
122. See also Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979).
123. See also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 954-57 (1985).
124. See Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 64-83 (1994).
125. Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002).
126. See, e.g., DAVID LANGE & JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 169 (2009).
127. Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 720 (2006).
128. Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45, 72 (2007).
129. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 361-64 (1996).
130. Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 312 (2006).
131. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1539-67 (2005).
132. Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522-31 (1990).
133. See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 48-60 (1994).
134. Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 398-441 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions].
135. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1975 (2006).
136. See, e.g., Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
137. See supra Part I.B.
138. See supra Part I.B.
139. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).
140. See A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
141. See Entm't Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997); Batlin v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976).
142. See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 91 (2007).
143. See supra Part I.B.
144. The leading account of this distinction is by Professor David Lyons
145. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 2-4 (1965)
146. See Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 9, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule.
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) ("In determining whether the use made of a work. .. is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include. .. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature. .. ."); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (finding use presumptively fair because it was of a noncommercial nature).
148. Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 271-72 (2004).
149. See Jeremy Waldron, Locating Distribution, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 287-93 (2003).
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980).
152. See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1987).
153. See Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. 62, 63 (2009) ("[T]respass makes any volitional boundary crossing unlawful.").
154. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 114-15 (1995).
155. Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 116-17 (2001).
156. See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, at 120-21 (Martin Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts Press 22d prtg. 1984) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
157. See Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 237 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
158. See also Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2000).
159. Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2006).
160. For a fuller explication of this idea, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normative Structure of Copyright Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013).
161. Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 3, 4 (2003).
162. See supra Part I
163. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include. .. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
165. Jules L. Coleman, Intellectual Property and Corrective Justice, 78 VA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1992).
166. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
167. For other labor-based explanations of copyright law, see generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
168. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1067-68 (2008).
169. For an interesting discussion of the idea of "rights-based" approaches to copyright, dispelling some of the common mistakes that this entails, see Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 553-56 (2006).
170. Indeed, this is manifested in the Copyright Act's own limited recognition of author's rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006) ("[T]he author of a work of visual art. .. shall have the right. .. to claim authorship of that work. .. .").
171. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330-39 (1988).
172. See also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958-59 (1982).
173. See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 146-47 (2010).
174. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
175. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
176. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146 (2d Cir. 1987).
177. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he only rights that exist under copyright law are those granted by statute.").
178. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661 (1834) ("Congress, then, by this act, [Act of 1790,] instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.").
179. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 661-62.
180. See generally DAVID ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (2002)
181. John Rawls, The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251 (1988).
182. Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good, 20 PHILOSOPHIA 15, 15-16 (1990)
183. See GERASIMOS SANTAS, GOODNESS AND JUSTICE: PLATO, ARISTOTLE, AND THE MODERNS 155 (2001)
184. See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 11-12 (1997)
185. JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13 (2001).
186. For a fuller discussion of bipolarity and its connection to broader public goals, see Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809, 811-13 (2008).
187. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) ("Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to create. .. .").
188. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, (1994) ("Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible.").
189. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1491-1502 (2007).
190. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1092-1122 (2007) ("While the doctrine's attention to context has many salutary attributes, it is so case-specific that it offers precious little guidance about its scope to artists, educators, journalists, Internet users, and others who require use of another's copyrighted expression in order to communicate effectively.").
191. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1998).
192. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972) ("Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.").
193. For a detailed explication of this idea in copyright law. see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1674 (2012).
194. Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837, 861 (1997).
195. See supra Part I.C.
196. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 787-88 (2003).
197. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
198. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, No. 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1996), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
199. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 980.
200. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
201. Am. Dental Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 92 C 5909, 1996 WL 224494, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 1996), vacated, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
202. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 979-80.
203. Am. Dental, 1996 WL 224494, at *8-9.
204. Am. Dental, 1996 WL 224494, at *4-5.
205. Am. Dental, 126 F.3d at 978-79.
206. Kregos v. Associated Press, 731 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
207. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991).
208. Kregos, 731 F. Supp. at 119.
209. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 706-07.
210. See, e.g. Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 70-73 (2d Cir. 1994).
211. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 707.
212. Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993).
213. Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (2d Cir. 1993).
214. Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1332.
215. Kregos, 3 F.3d at 663-64.
216. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1991).
217. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
218. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679.
219. See Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1973).
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
221. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996).
222. [17] U.S.C. § 107(2)-(3).
223. See supra Part I.B.
224. See supra Part I.B.
225. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int'l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1314 n.30 (11th Cir. 2008).
226. Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 1028 (2007) ("Under the harm-based approach to fair use. .. the plaintiff should bear the burden in such cases to prove that such harm has occurred or is likely to occur.").
227. Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 790, 801 (1975).
228. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555 n.3.
229. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (observing how the second factor is not of much help when the copying is of an expressive work); FMC Corp. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 539, 579-80 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
230. For an example of a court actually using the factor this way, see the Second Circuit's opinion in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). For a fuller discussion, see infra Part IV.B.3.
231. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
232. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
233. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 395-96 (1999).
234. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1789 (1988).
235. GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL (1979).
236. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542-43.
237. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069-70 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
238. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
239. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
240. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
241. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
242. See supra Part II
243. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548.
244. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 206.
245. See supra Part I.B.
246. See supra Part II.C.1.
247. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
248. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
249. Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 208.
250. See supra Part II.B.
251. See supra Part III.D.
252. See supra Part III.C.
253. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
254. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554, 558 (1985).