Expressive incentives in intellectual property

Virginia Law Review

Volumn 98, Issue 8, 2012, Pages 1745-1824

  Fromer, Jeanne C ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW   (United States)

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EID: 84855389291     PISSN: 00426601     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (338)

1. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1885, 1894-96 (2011). I do not consider those other forms herein.
2. See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 Yale L.J. 186, 188 (2008)
3. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 590, 590-91 (1987)
5. Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, in The Construction of Authorship 159, 171 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
6. Some legal scholarship occasionally hints at related possibilities. E.g., Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 664-65 (2006) ("[W]ithholding copyright from fine artists-but granting moral rights-would address the primary concerns of Creators, who care more about the integrity of their work, and receiving credit for its authorship, than they do about licensing its reproduction on consumer goods.")
7. cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 1 Ent. L. Rev. 121 (1990) (analyzing how some common-law countries-Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-have recently implemented moral-rights protections for authors).
8. E.g., David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives To Innovate, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1613, 1615 (2009)
9. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 986-87 (1999)
10. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1569, 1571 (2009)
11. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326-27 (1989).
12. But cf. Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope's Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 La. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2008) (suggesting that there are "types of works created and distributed without the primary motivation being the marketable right provided by copyright law," such as model legal codes and advertising copy)
13. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 Theoretical Inquiries L. 29, 29 (2011) (discussing the inadequacy of the incentive model).
14. Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1310 (2001).
15. See Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347, 370-71 (2005)
16. Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 175, 175, 178 (2007)
17. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 463, 497-98, 500-01 (2010).
18. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 265 (2009) (maintaining that "moral rights law obstructs rather than enables the creation of art because the law fails to recognize the defining role that destruction has come to play in contemporary artistic practice")
19. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1109 (1990) ("First, all intellectual creative activity is in part derivative. There is no such thing as a wholly original thought or invention. Each advance stands on building blocks fashioned by prior thinkers. Second, important areas of intellectual activity are explicitly referential. Philosophy, criticism, history, and even the natural sciences require continuous reexamination of yesterday's theses." (footnote omitted)).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2006)
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring only that a work be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression" to be copyrightable).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102
23. Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). According to the Supreme Court, the idea/expression distinction "strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.'"
24. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (1983)).
25. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ferguson v. NBC, 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978))
26. Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1996)).
27. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
28. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
29. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 546-94 (2009) (describing these requirements and arguing that they do not suffice for useful and clear disclosures).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a).
31. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
32. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (declaring the purpose of the first U.S. copyright law to be "An Act for the encouragement of learning")
33. Cong. Rec. 2834 (1976) (statement of Sen. McClellan)
34. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980)
35. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945)
36. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1597-99 (2003)
37. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697, 697-98 (2001).
38. See Alina Ng, The Author's Rights in Literary and Artistic Works, 9 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 453, 454 (2009)
39. cf. Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 651, 676 (2000) [hereinafter The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension] (statement of Wendy Gordon) (discussing the implications of instrumentalism in copyright).
40. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System
41. J.L. & Econ. 265, 266 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 337, 337 (2008).
43. Another is the signaling theory, which proposes that patents are useful signals to financiers that the patenting firm is a worthy investment. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 636-37, 648 (2002)
44. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 37 (2005).
45. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
46. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property 168, 169-70 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (discussing this view).
47. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 997 (1997).
48. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 579, 592 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives (1st paperback ed. 2006)
50. John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1801 (2009)
51. F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 55 (2003)
52. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 37-52 (2010) (describing protections in France, Germany, and other countries). Legal implementations principally encapsulate rights of attribution and integrity.
53. Robert P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property 31-67 (2011)
54. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1540-83 (1993)
55. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 296-330 (1988).
56. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 609 (1993)
57. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, Stan. L. Rev. 957, 957 (1982).
58. accord Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 4 (1988) (noting that Hegelians "establish a connection between respect for property and respect for persons"). While Radin discusses the general theory for property in depth, she merely notes that personhood theory has relevance to copyright law.
59. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 489, 490-93 (2006).
60. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 871, 874-75 (2007).
61. Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 880 (1997) (reviewing James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society (1996)) ("Think of Einstein the patent clerk, working late into the night on the theory of relativity, or Darwin the scientist-explorer, recording in his journal ideas that would shake the world.")
62. accord Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain Part II, 18 Colum.- VLA J.L. & Arts 191, 213-18 (1994) (observing that patent law confers rights on inventors that have employed a particular brand of creative genius).
63. But see Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 81, 81-82 (1998) (noting the argument that "the creator's personality interest in her work must be balanced against the personality interest of consumers-who will be further creators-using her work in their own acts of creation/expression")
64. John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2011) (same).
65. Register of Copyrights, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 4 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter Copyright Office Report]
66. Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the Millennium, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 719, 722 (1998)
67. see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2003).
68. Visual Artists' Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-30 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)).
69. But see H.R. Rep. No. 100-609, at 32-37 (1988) (asserting that pre-1990 copyright law granted moral rights required by the Berne Convention).
70. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. Legal Stud. 95, 95-96 (1997).
71. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 Duke L.J. 455, 455.
72. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 De- Paul L. Rev. 1063, 1066 (2003). An exhaustive definition of authorship would surely be more complex (and would tend to vary by country).
73. Bruce W. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 50-51 (1996).
74. Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 2-3 (1967).
75. Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Sole Right. . . Shall Return to the Authors": Anglo-American Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1475, 1477-78 (2010).
76. Craig Joyce, "A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature": Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 Hous. L. Rev. 325, 330, 361 (2005).
77. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19 (Eng.).
78. See Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 595, 599-600, 605, 649 (1993) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)).
79. Cf. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1549, 1559 (2003) ("Utilitarianism and personhood now provide the two main justifications for [real] property rights. . . . Founding Era natural-right theory started from the insight that people rely on having free control over their labor and their external possessions. If this insight is substantially correct, that reliance must count heavily in a utilitarian justification of property.").
80. See, e.g., Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms- Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 Org. Sci. 187, 187-88 (2008) (cooking)
81. Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians' Intellectual Property Without Law, in Law and Magic: A Collection of Essays 123, 124 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010) (magic)
82. Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1787, 1790-91 (2008) (stand-up comedy). There is also scholarship on norms and their relationship to copyright and patent law.
83. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77, 79-80 (1999) (discussing norms as an alternative to securing exclusive patent rights)
84. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899, 1905-06 (2007) (discussing influence of norms on scope of IP rights)
85. Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 Duke L.J. 919, 928-29 (2011) (referencing a "disconnect between patent law and the norms of science")
86. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 543- 50 (discussing disparity between copyright law and norms of infringement).
87. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1151, 1155 (2007)
88. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 993-94, 1023 (1990)
89. Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 319, 319 (2008)
90. Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
91. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
92. Cf. Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 323, 325-28 (2008) (providing a general model for incorporating threshold deontological constraints into economic analysis of the law).
93. Cf. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 652, 660 (2010) ("In legal discourse, [rhetoric's] appeal has two valences. First, rhetoric frames legal arguments, and those frames determine what substantive legal analysis applies to the issue at hand. Second, the choice to use particular terms can persuade-or dissuade-by calling up particular associations that generate visceral reactions in listeners.")
94. Jessica Silbey, Comparative Tales of Origins and Access: Intellectual Property and the Rhetoric of Social Change, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 195, 199 (2010) (concluding that some movements to expand public access to intellectual property are undercut by utilizing the underlying rhetoric and values of traditional intellectual property law).
95. E.g., Christopher J. Buccafusco, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher J. Sprigman, Empirical Studies of Incentives in Intellectual Property (forthcoming manuscript, to be on file with author).
96. Cf. Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 37 (2006) (positing that if information producers do not need the incentive of exclusive rights to create and exploit their works, the justification for giving them would be diminished).
97. S.C. Gilfillan, The Sociology of Invention 10-11, 71-74 (1935). As an example of such evidence, this work points to the frequency of near-simultaneous inventions.
98. see Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 709, 709-12 (2012) (discussing the implications of the limited importance of the sole inventor, contrary to this myth, for patent law). With regard to literary works, one robust strand of literary analysis has sought to show that the author ought not be the central figure in literary works, above and beyond, say, the audience that interprets these works, those literary works from which the author is inspired and borrows, and the publisher that distributes and markets these works.
99. See David Saunders, Authorship and Copyright 5-9 (1992) (showing historically that in addition to the Romantic notion of the author, there has also been a cultural and collaborative conception of authorship)
100. Lior Zemer, The Idea of Authorship in Copyright 6 (2007)
101. Margaret Atwood, Negotiating with the Dead: A Writer on Writing, at xx-xxii (2002).
102. See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi & Eugene Rochberg-Halton, The Meaning of Things: Domestic Symbols and the Self 16 (1981)
103. John Christman, Distributive Justice and the Complex Structure of Ownership, 23 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 225, 235-37 (1994)
104. Lita Furby, Possessions: Toward a Theory of Their Meaning and Function Throughout the Life Cycle, in 1 Life-Span Development and Behavior 297, 317-23 (Paul B. Baltes ed., 1978)
105. Jon L. Pierce et al., The State of Psychological Ownership: Integrating and Extending a Century of Research, 7 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 84, 85-86 (2003)
106. Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 47 J. Psychol. 13, 18 (1959)
107. see F.W. Rudmin & J.W. Berry, Semantics of Ownership: A Free-Recall Study of Property, 37 Psychol. Rec. 257, 266 (1987).
108. accord Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality 276-77 (2002).
109. accord Hegel, Philosophy of Right §§ 68-69, at 54-56 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1821)
110. Anne Lamott, Bird by Bird: Some Instructions on Writing and Life, at xiv (1994).
111. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech to the Parliament of England for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing 9-10 (Ralph, Holland & Co. 6th ed. 1906) (1644)
112. accord Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
113. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1997)
114. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 207 (1891).
115. See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1441, 1462-65 (2010).
116. The fact that creators value their works more highly than do purchasers and owners of these works, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 39-40 (2011), is likely related, at least partially, to these personhood interests.
117. See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 38 (1993).
118. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995).
119. Letter from Michelangelo to Ser Giovan Francesco Fattucci (Jan. 1524), in Artists on Art 61, 62 (Robert Goldwater & Marco Treves eds., Pantheon Books 1945).
120. Symposium, Artists Don't Get No Respect: Panel on Attribution and Integrity, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 435, 444-45 (2005) (statement of Eugene Mopsik).
121. Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1881-86 (1990)
122. cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 513, 522-27 (2009) (arguing that creativity is often inspired by non-economic, intrinsic motivation).
123. Ariston Anderson, Francis Ford Coppola: On Risk, Money, Craft and Collaboration, 99U, http://www.99u.com/articles/6973/Francis-Ford-Coppola-On- Risk-Money-Craft-Collaboration (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
124. Jacob W. Getzels & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, The Creative Vision 154 (1976).
125. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity 85 (1996).
126. See Gijs van Hensbergen, Guernica: The Biography of a Twentieth-Century Icon 3 (2004).
127. E.g., Philip Roth, Portnoy's Complaint (1969)
128. Philip Roth, The Ghost Writer (1979).
129. See Philip Roth, The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography 135-36 (1988).
130. Ethan Bronner, An Israeli Novelist Writes of Pain, Public and Private, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2010, at C1 (discussing David Grossman's novel To the End of the Land).
131. Nicole Richie, The Truth About Diamonds, at vii-viii (2005).
132. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 5 (2003)
133. See generally Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit, The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society 13 (2004) (studying the central human desire for esteem, or prestige).
134. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 41, 58 (2007).
135. See Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar 64 (1999)
136. See, e.g., Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 Hamline L. Rev. 65, 78 (1997)
137. cf. Patricia Kanngiesser et al., The Effect of Creative Labor on Property- Ownership Transfer by Preschool Children and Adults, 21 Psychol. Sci. 1236, 1238-40 (2010) (discussing empirical evidence indicating creative labor has an effect on ownership judgments in children and adults).
138. 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries 405-06
139. See J.A. Chambers, Relating Personality and Biographical Factors to Scientific Creativity, 78 Psychol. Monographs: Gen. & Applied, no. 7, 1964, at 1, 6, 18-19 ("The creative research man thus emerges as the dominant, strongly motivated individualist who is selfpropelled and whose interests are channeled away from social and civic activities and are directed towards his own individual research problems.").
140. Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science 273 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). Professor Robert Merton's thinking might hold more strongly for the scientific community generating theories than for technological innovators. The former is less relevant to intellectual property, as scientific theories typically are not protectable, while innovation based on those theories is.
141. See, e.g., Henry Sauermann & Wesley M. Cohen, What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm Innovation, 56 Mgmt. Sci. 2134, 2134 (2010)
142. John P. Walsh & Sadao Nagaoka, Who Invents?: Evidence from the Japan-U.S. Inventor Survey 22 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus., Working Paper No. 09-E-034, 2009), available at http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/ publications/dp/09e034.pdf
143. Alfonso Gambardella et al., PatVal-EU Project, The Value of European Patents: Evidence from a Survey of European Inventors, 4- 5, 35-36 (2005), available at http://www.alfonsogambardella.it/PATVALFinalReport.pdf.
144. Joseph Rossman, Industrial Creativity: The Psychology of the Inventor 200 (1964).
145. Leon Jaroff, Intellectual Chain Gang, Time, Feb. 10, 1997, at 64.
146. Taborsky Case Study: Wastewater Treatment 8, IPAdvocate.org, http://www.ipadvocate.org/studies/taborsky/Taborsky.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2012).
147. Morning Edition: Disputes Rise over Intellectual Property Rights (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 30, 1996), transcript available at http://www.cptech.org/ ip/npr.txt.
148. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the 'Fuel of Interest' from the 'Fire of Genius': Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1133, 1137-38, 1160 (1998)
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 333 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
150. Dean Keith Simonton, Scientific Genius: A Psychology of Science 34-35 (1988).
151. See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention 83-84 (1996)
152. R. Keith Sawyer, Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation 147-48 (2006)
153. Anne Roe, The Psychology of the Scientist, 134 Science 456, 457 (1961).
154. see Michael J. Gelb & Sarah Miller Caldicott, Innovate Like Edison: The Success System of America's Greatest Inventor 47 (2007) (highlighting Thomas Edison's "solution-centered mindset" as essential to his inventive success).
155. See Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation 3, 22-23 (2005)
156. Eric von Hippel, The Sources of Innovation 25-26 (1988)
157. Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 467, 468-69, 478-81 (2008).
158. See William W. Fisher III, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 1417, 1418-30 (2010)
159. accord Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 Yale L.J. 177, 197-98 (1987)
160. See John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 555 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (quoting Thomas Alva Edison).
161. E.g. Chris Dunmire, Inspiration vs. Perspiration: A Light Bulb Moment on Edison's Creative Genius, CoachingYourCreativity.com, http://www. coachingyourcreativity.com/articles/inspiration-perspiration.shtml (last visited Aug. 25, 2012)
162. Parin, "Genius Is 1% Inspiration and 99% Perspiration." - Thomas Edison, theGREATnessMIND.com, Nov. 25, 2010, http://www.thegreatnessmind. com/2010/11/25/genius-is-1-percent-inspiration-and-99- percent-perspiration- thomas-edison/.
163. Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life 118 (1986).
164. See generally Stefan Wuchty et al., The Increasing Dominance of Teams in Production of Knowledge, 316 Science 1036 (2007) (showing that teams increasingly produce knowledge across a wide range of domains, including science, engineering, social sciences, arts, and humanities).
165. See Acme Highway Prods. v. D.S. Brown Co., 431 F.2d 1074, 1083 (6th Cir. 1970) (applying for this reason a clear and convincing standard to claim of joint inventorship for a patent issued in the name of a single inventor)
166. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Int'l Party, 701 F. Supp. 314, 340 (D. Conn. 1988) (noting that one inventor's feeling of sole ownership did not imply that invention was not joint).
167. In an ongoing project of interviews with artists and inventors, Professor Jessica Silbey finds that obtaining intellectual property protection is important to creators as a moral and personal matter. E-mail from Jessica Silbey to author (July 8, 2010, 10:08 EST) (on file with author)
168. cf. Mary Madden, Pew/Internet & American Life Project, Artists, Musicians and the Internet 20, Dec. 5, 2004, available at http://www. pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2004/PIP-Artists.Musicians-Report.pdf. pdf (showing that half of all artists questioned think that copyright laws are successful in protecting artists' rights).
169. See, e.g., Beth A. Hennessey & Teresa M. Amabile, Reward, Intrinsic Motivation, and Creativity, 53 Am. Psychologist 674 (1998). These incentives tend to be pecuniary. Forthcoming work assesses how the particular incentives intellectual property offers or might offer affect creativity.
170. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health 3 (2008) (making the case for cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation).
171. See generally Ruth W. Grant, Strings Attached: Untangling the Ethics of Incentives 6 (2012).
172. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099, 2117 (2000). For copyright statistics
173. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 141, 142-43.
174. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 38-40 (1999). The need for expressive incentives in the law might be diminished in cases of corporate creation to the extent that firms comprehensively provide optimal expressive incentives to motivate their employees. That is only the case, however, if these incentives operate effectively.
175. Julie E. Cohen et al., Copyright in a Global Information Economy 131 (3d ed. 2010).
176. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1029-30 (1995).
177. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944)
178. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273-74 (10th Cir. 1987)
179. William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers' Rights, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 1115, 1121 (2011).
180. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets: Tangibility, Authorship, and Legality, 3 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 197, 231 (2006)
181. Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274, 294-99 (1967)
182. cf. Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2006) (positing that law and morality share a deep structure "to allow us to resolve various classes of social contract problems flexibly").
183. Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603, 1614 (2000). Another suggests that the law helps coordinate people's behavior by providing a normative focal point.
184. Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 Or. L. Rev. 1, 20 (2000)
185. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1649, 1651-53 (2000).
186. accord Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1989, 2009-10 (2000).
187. See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function of Criminal Law, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 165, 183 (2001).
188. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453, 454 (1997)
189. Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just?: Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1839, 1863 (2000).
190. There is, however, a difference from the criminal context. Criminal law operates to sanction violators, even when they are ignorant of its rules. United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971).
191. For this reason, coincidence of norm and criminal law sensibly causes even the ignorant to obey the criminal law. By contrast, intellectual property incentives can work only when creators are aware of them. That said, as most authors and inventors are repeat players in the intellectual property system, Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 501, 538 (2010), they are likely to have this awareness after a first legal interaction.
192. Cf. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 710 (2007) ("Although [contract] law should not aim to enforce interpersonal morality as such, the law's content should be compatible with the conditions necessary for moral agency to flourish. Some aspects of U.S. contract law not only fail to support the morally decent person, but also contribute to a legal and social culture that is difficult for the morally decent person to accept. Indeed, U.S. contract law may sometimes make it harder for the morally decent person to behave decently.").
193. Charles R. Tittle & Alan R. Rowe, Moral Appeal, Sanction Threat, and Deviance: An Experimental Test, 20 Soc. Probs. 488, 488, 496 (1973)
194. Nigel Walker & Michael Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 Brit. J. Criminology 570, 570 (1964).
195. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1504 (2000)
196. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2024-28 (1996). In Professor Matthew Adler's view, expressive theories conflict with utilitarianism in that maximizing utility has nothing to do with expression.
197. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1461-63, 1472-73 (2000). I, however, think they are compatible, as sending expressive signals through the law can maximize utility.
198. Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1563, 1563 (2012) (developing a framework for analyzing appearance-based justifications of laws, including laws addressing campaign finance and broken-windows policing).
199. Orthogonal is the notion in trademark law that marks can become important for societal and cultural expression. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 397-98 (1990).
200. Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82 Geo. L.J. 2409, 2410 (1994)
201. accord Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 760 (2009)
202. Carol M. Rose, Introduction: Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel, 18 Yale J.L. & Human. 1, 6-9 (2006).
203. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349, 350-52 (1997).
204. But see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 97-103 (2000) (arguing that criminal punishments that shame can fail to deter when the relevant subcommunity sees these punishments as a badge of honor).
205. cf. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473, 475 (2006) (exposing the link between blame and utility for criminal liability for entities).
206. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 7 (Hackett Publ'g Co. 2d ed. 2001) (1861)
207. accord Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970) (1780).
208. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. Tim Mulgan, Understanding Utilitarianism 120 (2007)
210. accord David O. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1671 (2010).
211. see also J.S. Mill, On Liberty 55 (The MacMillan Co. 1947) (1859)
212. cf. Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory 10 (1984) ("The line of demarcation between the instrumental view [of property and work] and the selfdevelopmental view is not sharp.").
213. John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in Utilitarianism and Beyond 39, 53 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
214. E.g., R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals 57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1952). These philosophical parallels might not satisfy those normatively committed above and beyond all other considerations to moral rights rather than utilitarianism. Some contemporary philosophers, most notably Professor David Lyons, seek to show how to read Mill as consistent with a "utilitarian approach to moral rights and justice" that avoids common problems philosophers usually encounter in trying to fuse the two, such as reconciling utilitarianism's maximization of welfare with inviolable rights.
215. David Lyons, Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory 14-17 (1994)
216. Philip Pettit, The Consequentialist Can Recognise Rights, 38 Phil. Q. 42, 51-53 (1988)
217. But see Amartya Sen, Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong with Welfare Economics?, 89 Econ. J. 537, 554 (1979).
218. Cf. Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1151, 1152 (2010) (studying in the context of encouraging employees to report illegality the efficacy of four different legal mechanisms: anti-retaliation protection, duty to report, liability fines, and monetary incentives).
219. Creative Commons "provide[s]. . . a set of copyright licenses and tools that create a balance inside the traditional 'all rights reserved' setting that copyright law creates," ranging from the possibility of opting out of copyright altogether to reserving some or all rights. About, Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
220. Glenn Otis Brown, Announcing (and Explaining) Our New 2.0 Licenses, Creative Commons, May 25, 2004, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/4216.
221. Christopher Jon Sprigman, Christopher J. Buccafusco & Zachary C. Burns, What's a Name Worth?: Valuing Attribution and Publication in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 26-27), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2011403. Based on this finding, Sprigman, Buccafusco, and Burns tentatively argue against an attribution right in creators because it would likely result in fewer (or less efficient) bargains, because now authors must bargain for this valuable right.
222. Emily Heil, 'Texts from Hillary' Photographer Didn't LOL-at First, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 2012, 11:34 AM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/ post/texts-fromhillary-photographer-didnt-lol-at-first/2012/04/11/ gIQApNcZAT-blog.html.
223. Katherine J. Strandburg, Physicians and Patents: A Tale of Two Innovation Systems, in Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter IP at the Edge].
224. 35 U.S.C. §§ 115-116 (2006) (amended 2011).
225. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 122-29, §§ 4, 20, 125 Stat. 284, 295 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C.). The previous implementation of patent law had provided two possible remedies for failure to attribute the invention in the patent to the correct set of inventors. If an attribution error was made without deceptive intent, the PTO could have authorized a correction, with no further repercussion to the patent rights.
226. 35 U.S.C. §§ 115-116, 256 (amended 2011).
227. That said, many, if not most, commercialized patented inventions are attributable to their inventors indirectly through the invention itself. Patent law encourages patentees to mark their inventions with the associated patent number, so as to provide notice (constructively) of patent rights for damages recovery in an infringement action. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (amended 2011). Doing so leads interested parties from invention to patent, which attributes the invention to its inventors.
228. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in the Age of the Patent Troll, 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 52, 58 n.22 (2009) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 116)
229. See Núñez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000)
230. Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 409 (2006).
232. 37 C.F.R. § 201.5(b)(2)(ii) (2011).
233. 17 U.S.C. § 201.
234. see also U.S. Copyright Office, Form TX, http://www.copyright.gov/forms/ form tx.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
235. Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright Duration and the Progressive Degeneration of a Constitutional Doctrine, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 189, 237 (2005).
236. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (superseded 1976).
237. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101, 201, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544, 2568 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
238. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1075, 1088 (superseded 1976)
239. Jennifer Sutherland Lubinski, Comment, The Work for Hire Doctrine Under Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid: An Artist's Fair Weather Friend, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 119, 120-21 (1996).
240. Andre Lucas & Pascal Kamina Robert Plaisant, France, in International Copyright Law and Practice § 4(1)(b) (Paul Edward Geller ed., 2011).
241. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2006).
242. E.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981)
243. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311-12 (2d Cir. 1934)
244. Simon & Schuster v. Dove Audio, 970 F. Supp. 279, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
246. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).
247. Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 809, 887 (2010). More helpful have been some courts' interpretations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which prohibits certain removals of copyright management information attached to copyrighted works.
248. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006). Some courts have found a violation under this provision when attribution to the author was removed from a work, even though it does not seem Congress intended such an instance to count as an encroachment.
249. Rebecca Tushnet, Naming Rights: Attribution and Law, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 789, 797- 811.
250. Millennium Trilogy by Stieg Larsson, Literary Mag. Swedish Books & Authors, http://www.stieglarsson.com/Millennium-series (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). The books in the trilogy are The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, The Girl Who Played with Fire, and The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet's Nest.
251. Genevieve Hassan, Hollywood Takes on Girl with the Dragon Tattoo, BBC News, Dec. 25, 2011, 8:03 PM, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts- 16110375.
252. See Charles McGrath, J.D. Salinger, Author Who Fled Fame, Dies at 91, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2010, at A1.
253. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
254. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (superseded 1976).
255. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Report].
256. Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentive To Create Under a "Lifetime-Plus-Years" Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashchroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 437, 456 (2002). For another thing, it becomes harder to determine copyright duration for works made up of separate contributions (such as a book comprised of original essays), as the copyright in each contribution will expire at the conclusion of seventy years following the death of its author.
257. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 302(e) (1976), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 302(e) (2006).
258. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 302(c). This Act also treats differently works that were jointly authored but not made for hire, by virtue of the fact that they have multiple authors.
259. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, sec. 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
260. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006).
261. See Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1181 (1977).
262. See Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, Patent Length and the Timing of Innovative Activity, 55 J. Indus. Econ. 772, 772 (2007)
263. Ted O'Donoghue, Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 1, 4 (1998).
264. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
265. See Samuel J. Elder, Duration of Copyright, 14 Yale L.J. 417, 422 (1905)
266. See The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 31 (1995) (statement of Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce of the United States).
267. See 1 Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond § 1.04 (2d ed. 2006).
268. Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986, at §§ 7.9, 7.14 (1987).
269. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c.19, §§ I, XI (Eng.).
270. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802).
271. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
272. L. Ray Patterson & Stanley F. Birch, Jr., A Unified Theory of Copyright (Craig Joyce ed., 2009), printed in 46 Hous. L. Rev. 215, 272 (2009).
273. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)
274. Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717, 756 n.153 (2007)
275. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, The Music Industry Copyright Battle: When Is Owning More Like Renting?, Freakonomics, Aug. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM, http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/08/31/the-music-industry-copyright-battle-when- isowning-more-like-renting.
276. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It's an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright's Elusive Essence, 28 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 189-90 (2005).
277. 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991).
278. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). Others might copy Keats's poem because any copyright on it has long expired, leaving the work in the public domain.
279. See John C. O'Quinn, Protecting Private Intellectual Property from Government Intrusion: Revisiting SmithKline and the Case for Just Compensation, 29 Pepp. L. Rev. 435, 504 n.455 (2002).
280. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-64.
281. Alan E. Garfield, Calibrating Copyright Statutory Damages to Promote Speech, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2010).
282. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
283. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006).
284. Dennis D. Crouch, Is Novelty Obsolete? Chronicling the Irrelevance of the Invention Date in U.S. Patent Law, 16 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 53, 56 (2009)
285. Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 Hastings L.J. 1299, 1299 (2003).
286. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1) (2006).
287. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3, § 100, 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
288. There is empirical evidence that this effect would occur. David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? How the America Invents Act Harms Inventors, 65 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-6).
289. See Karen E. Simon, Comment, The Patent Reform Act's Proposed First-To-File Standard: Needed Reform or Constitutional Blunder?, 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 129, 150 (2006).
290. See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 445, 463-64, 468 (2007) (citing other proponents of this view).
291. Adam J. Sedia, Storming the Last Bastion: The Patent Reform Act of 2007 and Its Assault on the Superior First-To-Invent Rule, 18 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 79, 124-25 (2007).
292. Cf. Ryan K. Dickey, Note, The First-To-Invent Patent Priority System: An Embarrassment to the International Community, 24 B.U. Int'l L.J. 283, 292 (2006) ("Arguments to retain the first-to-invent system are especially powerful in light of non-utilitarian theories, such as fairness and personhood.").
293. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
294. Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
295. Guang Ming Whitley, Comment, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The "Extended" Written Description Requirement, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 617, 618, 629 (2004).
296. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345.
297. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).
298. E.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346 n.4.
299. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112.
300. Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 Yale L.J. Online 127, 144 (2010).
301. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1360 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (citing Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Prosecution, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1665, 1676 (2010))
302. Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1, 5, 58 (2007).
303. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1364 (Rader, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
304. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). This, however, does not mean that a person skilled in the art must be enabled to make and use "a perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation to that effect." CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
305. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, 503 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
306. See, e.g., Allen K. Yu, The En Banc Federal Circuit's Written Description Requirement: Time for the Supreme Court To Reverse Again?, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 895, 910-11 (2012).
307. 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
308. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006).
309. Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479 (reasoning that the patent specification "provides for only the most minor variation in the location of the controls, noting that the control 'may be mounted on top or side surfaces of the console rather than on the front wall. . . without departing from this invention'" (quoting '244 Patent col.2 l. 68-col.3, line 3)).
310. 35 U.S.C. § 115.
311. Not all authors care very deeply about maintaining control over derivative works, particularly noncommercial ones. Over two-thirds of Creative Commons licensors permit others to use their creations to make derivative works. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 565 (2004).
312. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2006) (providing any "author of a work of visual art" with certain integrity rights)
313. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
314. Gilliam v. Am. Broad., 538 F.2d 14, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1976).
315. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
316. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
317. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994) (holding that 2 Live Crew's rap version of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" may be a fair use within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 107).
318. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, 448 F.3d 605, 606-07 (2d Cir. 2006) (judging the use of small versions of posters for Grateful Dead concerts in a book on the history of the band to be fair use).
319. Núñez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2000) (judging the use of semi-nude modeling photographs of Miss Puerto Rico Universe in a news story about a scandal about those photographs' propriety to be fair use).
320. see also Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1094-95 (2007) (referencing judicial and scholarly frustration with the four-factor test)
321. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1107 (1990) ("Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.").
322. But see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 574-75 (2008) (suggesting, after an empirical review of fair-use doctrine in the courts, that it is somewhat more predictable than is typically thought)
323. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1533 (2004) (maintaining that "social and cultural patterns underlying case-by-case adjudication of fair use problems may have achieved. . . a framework. . . that is both stable and relatively predictable in the context of legal doctrine").
324. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 887-88 (2007).
325. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the use to be fair).
326. See Warner Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 520-22, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding the use not to be fair).
327. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719, 723 (2009).
328. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1488-89 (2007) (proposing safe harbors that would treat minimal uses, such as the reproduction of films that are ten seconds or less, as per se valid).
329. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2541 (2009).
330. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)
331. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5 (2010)
332. Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 321, 322 (2009).
333. A transfer is defined broadly as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
334. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006)
335. see Abraxis Bioscience v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
336. Gaia Techs. v. Reconversion Techs. 93 F.3d 774, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
337. Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Federal Law: A National Imperative, 23 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 195, 270 (2001).
338. Effects Assocs. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990).