Our bizarre system for proving copyright infringement

Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A.

Volumn 57, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 719-742

  Lemley, Mark A ^a,b  

^a STANFORD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Durie Tangri LLP ^*  (United States)

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EID: 79959627051     PISSN: 08863520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (128)

1. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
2. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
3. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984);
4. Repp v. Lloyd Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997).
5. Indeed, Alan Latman suggests that this analysis be called "probative similarity." Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990). Some courts have adopted this language.
6. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
7. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
8. See also SMS v. ASP, 560 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009);
9. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998) (referring to de minimis copying as "so trivial as to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity");
10. Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 316 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1963) (copying of less than two sentences from a book "a clear case of de minimis");
11. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966).
12. Paul Goldstein suggests that there should be no de minimis test in copyright, preferring instead to focus on whether the copying attracted the audience away from the plaintiffs work. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.3.1, at 9-30-9-32 (2010). But the de minimis principle is well established in the law.
13. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ'ns v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 316-21 (6th Cir. 2004);
14. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996).
15. In the Third Circuit's colorful language, "[w]hile'(r)ose is a rose is a rose is a rose', substantial similarity is not always substantial similarity." Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
16. 452 F.3d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006) (some citations omitted).
17. Id.
18. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) ("But there also must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well. Thus two steps in the analytic process are implied by the requirement of substantial similarity.").
19. For example, those who copy expression to mock or parody it might have a fair use defense, but their copying is no less copying because the idea behind it is different.
20. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S. D. N. Y. 1987).
21. Id. at 710.
22. Bridgamon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2003): A copyright infringement claim requires proof of (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) actionable copying, which is the copying of constituent elements of the work that are copyrightable.
23. Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994)
24. (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U. S. 340, 361 (1991). Two separate inquiries must be made to determine whether actionable copying has occurred. The first question is whether the alleged infringer copied, or "actually used the copyrighted material in his own work." Id. Copying can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.
25. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J.). Circumstantial evidence may support an inference of copying if the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and there is "probative similarity" between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work.
26. Eng'g Dynamics, Inc., 26 F.3d at 1340.
27. Accord Laureyssens v. Idea Group, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992);
28. Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2005).
29. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). It is worth noting that the result in Arnstein - to reverse summary judgment to defendant Cole Porter on Arnstein's claim that Porter hired "stooges" to follow him around and steal his songs - seems crazy. Arnstein was a serial litigant who sued any number of famous musicians alleging copying.
30. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936);
31. Arnstein v. Broad. Music, 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943).
32. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 68.
33. See, e.g., Ringgold v. BET, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997);
34. Laureyssens v. Idea Group, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992);
35. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1986).
36. But cf. Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the ordinary observer test did not work well in the case of a trivia book about the TV show Seinfeld, because the works were of such different types)
37. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. See Concrete Mach. Co., Inc. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608-09 (1st Cir. 1988).
40. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001);
41. Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2005).
42. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975).
43. See, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987);
44. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990);
45. Rice v. Fox Broad. Corp., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003).
46. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). It is perhaps worth noting that the Roth case was tried to the court, not a jury.
47. Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 374 (5th Cir. 2004).
48. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).
49. Amini Innovation v. Anthony California, 439 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
50. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732-36 (4th Cir. 1990).
51. Accord Lyons Partnership, L. P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001).
52. See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293-95 (6th Cir. 2004).
53. The Eleventh Circuit accepted Krofft in Herzog. See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999): Under the extrinsic test, a court will inquire into whether, as an objective matter, the works are substantially similar in protected expression. As a part of this test, a court will determine whether a plaintiff seeks to protect only uncopyrightable elements; if so, the court will grant summary judgment for defendant. Under the extrinsic test, expert testimony and analytic dissection are appropriate. Under the intrinsic test, a court will determine whether, upon proper instruction, a reasonable jury would find that the works are substantially similar. A court may grant summary judgment for defendant as a matter of law if the similarity between the two works concerns only noncopyrightable elements of the plaintiff's work or if no reasonable jury would find that the two works are substantially similar.
54. However, the court has also recognized the Arnstein two-part framework for infringement analysis, wherein the "ordinary observer" perspective applies to the misappropriation inquiry. Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The plaintiff can prove copying either directly or indirectly, by establishing that the defendant had access, and produced something 'substantially similar', to the copyrighted work.... Substantial similarity, in this sense, 'exists where an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work'").
55. Accord Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, 245 Fed. Appx. 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2007).
56. See also Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L. C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2008) (criticizing Herzog).
57. Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987) (expert opinion is admissible on question of actual copying or copying of ideas; analytical dissection is inappropriate when analyzing substantial similarity of expression);
58. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d at 726, 731 (8th Cir. 2006) (some citations omitted): Expert opinion and analytical dissection are not appropriate to establish or rebut similarity of expression.... Rather, "substantial similarity of expression is measured by the response of the ordinary, reasonable person to the forms of expression. "
59. While a few circuits mistakenly refer to that as a distinction between "copying of facts" and "copying of expression", see supra, in fact similarities of ideas, facts, and expression can all be evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the defendant in fact copied from the plaintiff.
60. See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293-95 (6th Cir. 2004);
61. accord Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc., v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2004) ("we apply a more stringent standard [than the Ninth Circuit] regarding when to allow expert testimony on the first part of the test").
62. Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614-15 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. Susan Wakeen Doll, Inc. v. Ashton Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2001).
64. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001).
65. 905 F.2d 731, 732-36 (4th Cir. 1990).
66. Accord Lyons Partnership, L. P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir. 2001).
67. See also Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
68. Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003).
69. Data East, 862 F.2d at 209.
70. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736-38 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding the issue of whether a choral arrangement of a public domain song should be judged by a lay observer or under a specialized observer test).
71. See also Sergiu Gherman, Harmony and Its Functionality: A Gloss on the Substantial Similarity Test in Music Copyrights, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MED. & ENT. L. J. 483, 485, 513-15 (2009) (arguing for the filtration of basic harmony from music copyright cases, and suggesting that the jury is unlikely to be able to apply the test easily);
72. Jeffrey Cadwell, Expert Testimony, Scenes a Faire, and Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test for Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137, 162-63 (2005) (same).
73. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
74. Bridgeport Music v. UMG Recordings, 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
75. See also Austin Padgett, The Rhetoric of Predictablity: Reclaiming the Lay Ear in Music Copyright Infringement Litigation, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 125, 146-47 (2008) (arguing against using specialized observers in the analysis of music cases).
76. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004).
77. See Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300-01 (D. C. Cir. 2002).
78. Cf Victoria Elman, From the Runway to the Courtroom: How Substantial Similarity Is Unfit for Fashion, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 683, 687 (2008) (arguing that if Congress adopts copyright-like protection for fashion, it should tailor the substantial similarity test to that industry).
79. Morissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
80. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1.2, at 9:4 (3d ed. 2007) ("From a policy perspective, the hardest case is the one in which the defendant's work reflects only structural similarities to the plaintiff's").
81. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980)
82. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994).
83. See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271 (2d Cir. 2001).
84. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002-03 (2d Cir. 1995).
85. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001).
86. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. 23 F.3d 805, 808-13 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. 2010 WL 2853761 (9th Cir. July 22, 2010).
89. Bridgeport Music v. UMG Recordings, 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).
90. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 706.
92. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1992).
93. See Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994)
94. ("Generally, we endorse the abstraction-filtration-comparison method of determining copyright protection for computer programs, which has been ably elucidated by the Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993).").
95. The Fifth Circuit does not appear to have considered the question of expert testimony's precise applicability, however. The Tenth Circuit also uses the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test, and admits expert testimony concerning abstraction. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834-36 (10th Cir. 1993).
96. First, in order to provide a framework for analysis, we conclude that a court should dissect the program according to its varying levels of generality as provided in the abstractions test. Second, poised with this framework, the court should examine each level of abstraction in order to filter out those elements of the program which are unprotectable. Filtration should eliminate from comparison the unprotectable elements of ideas, processes, facts, public domain information, merger material, scenes a faire material, and other unprotectable elements suggested by the particular facts of the program under examination. Third, the court should then compare the remaining protectable elements with the allegedly infringing program to determine whether the defendants have misappropriated substantial elements of the plaintiff's program.... The abstractions test is especially well suited to the dissection of computer programs because the test breaks down a program in a way that parallels the typical development of a program.... Application of the abstractions test will necessarily vary from caseto-case and program-to-program. Given the complexity and ever-changing nature of computer technology, we decline to set forth any strict methodology for the abstraction of computer programs. See generally Andrew H. Rosen, Virtual Reality: Copyrightable Subject Matter and the Scope of Judicial Protection, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 35 (1992). Indeed, in most cases we foresee that the use of experts will provide substantial guidance to the court in applying an abstractions test. However, a computer program can often be parsed into at least six levels of generally declining abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the program structure or architecture, (iii) modules, (iv) algorithms and data structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code.... These generalized levels of abstraction will not, of course, fit all computer codes. Ordinarily, expert testimony will be helpful to organize a particular program into various levels of abstraction. In any event, as pointed out earlier, the organization of a program into abstraction levels is not an end in itself, but it is only a tool that facilitates the critical next step of filtering out unprotectable elements of the program.
97. Accord Autoskill, Inc. v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1492-93 (10th Cir. 1993) ("We are convinced that the record furnishes an ample factual basis for the trial judge's analysis on the levels of abstraction and his conclusions as to which were idea levels not entitled to protection, and which were in the expression area and possibly eligible for protection after filtration analysis. There was detailed testimony by Autoskill's expert.... As the judge noted, the experts' opinions may be helpful, but their legal conclusions on these points are not binding. The consideration of the experts' views on these matters in drawing the judge's conclusions was within his discretion and not error.")
98. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Tiseo Architects, Inc. v. B&B Pools Serv. & Supply Co., 495 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2007).
100. Latman, supra note 4, at 1188.
101. Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U. S. 340 (1991).
102. Even constructed facts are treated as facts by the courts, and so as unprotectable. See, e.g., Urantia Found, v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997);
103. Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion, and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 791 (2001). For criticism of this approach
104. see Justin Hughes, Created Facts, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007).
105. Fonts are generally not copyrightable, see Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2007), though the computer code that implements a font is.
106. 17 U. S. C. § 102 (b) (2006);
107. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879);
108. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995);
109. Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2007).
110. 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
111. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures, 663 F. Supp. 706 1 (S. D. N. Y. 1987).
112. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1991).
113. The reader may want to know that I once represented Shepherd Fairey and Obey Giant in this case, but no longer do.
114. See Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 77 (2003) (suggesting that this has been the result).
115. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. World of Wonder v. Vector Intercontinental, 1986 WL 15608 (N. D. Ohio Dec. 31, 1986).
117. The Ninth Circuit reversed the finding of infringement because it concluded that the higher "virtual identity" standard should apply to the constrained expression in these works. Mattel v. MGA Entm't, 2010 WL 2853761 (9th Cir. July 22, 2010). While that decision is probably a step in the right direction, at the end of the day it leaves the underlying problem unaddressed. On remand, the jury is presumably to do the same thing - apply the ordinary observer test to the works as a whole. They simply must find a higher degree of similarity.
118. For an argument that that is precisely what we should do in music copyright cases, see Cadwell, supra note 41, at 137, 158;
119. Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 109, 112 (1995).
120. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that Ninth Circuit law "appears to be moving toward the test favored by Judge Sneed in his separate concurrence in which lay and expert testimony are uniformly admissible.");
121. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We need not and do not decide whether survey evidence of the sort tendered in this case would be admissible to aid a jury in resolving a claim of substantial similarity that lies within the range of reasonable factual dispute.").
122. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300-01 (D. C. Cir. 2002) (refusing to decide admissibility of expert evidence in an architectural works case).
123. Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2001).
124. For discussion of this issue, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 788 F. Supp. 78, 95-96 (D. Mass. 1992)
125. rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
126. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930);
127. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Or. 1987);
128. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 415-18, 420 (2d Cir. 1985).