Representation reconsidered

Representation Reconsidered

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-248

  Ramsey, William M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

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EID: 84926171055     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511597954     Document Type: Book

References (173)

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